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
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ON BAPTISM.

REPORT NO.

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ON BAPTISM;

CHIEFLY IN

REPLY

TO THE

Etymological Positions

OF

THE REV. GREVILLE EWING,

In his "Essay on Baptism;"

THE

Polemic Discussions

OF

THE REV. TIMOTHY DWIGHT, S.T.D. LL.D.

In his Work entitled "Theology;"

AND THE

Inferential Reasonings

OF

THE REV. RALPH WARDLAW, D.D.

In his "Lectures on the Abrahamic Covenant."

BY F. A. COX, A.M.

OF HACKNEY.

"Vehementer me agere fateor, iracundè nego. Omnino irasci amicis non temerè soleo, ne si merentur quidem. Sine verborum contumeliâ à te dissentire possum, sine animi summo dolore non possum."

CICERO.

LONDON:

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AGREEING most fully with the sentiment expressed by Mr. Ewing, in the Introduction to his Work, that “an endeavour to detect error, and to establish truth, is an act of friendship to every member of the body of Christ;” I trust that none of my pædobaptist friends will impute my present undertaking to any unchristian hostility. Had I felt the least irritation, I should never have attempted to write; being persuaded that the dispassionate inquirer is the only proper controversialist, and that he who trembles with anger, cannot judge with precision. I can discover no sufficient reason, why the differences of opinion among christians, on the subject of baptism, should not be placed on a similar footing of temperate and amicable litigation, to that which is sometimes observable in the proceedings of the brothers or sisters of a family, who go into courts of justice, not under the influence of rancour and malignity; but for the sake of settling, upon a firm basis, the simple question of property.

A baptist always writes with the peculiar disadvantage of having almost every periodical work that influences public opinion against him: he is aware, consequently, from the prepossession of the writers in these publications, that if they notice, they will condemn. This, however, does not deter me from what I conceive to be a public duty; nor,

when I consider the superior cultivation of the writers of the present day, in the religious as well as in the literary world, do I apprehend any of that coarse invective which, in other times, defiled the pages of theological disputants. As to the arguments themselves, they are published in order to be examined; I cannot, therefore, object to such examination, and hold myself bound to pay the utmost attention to every candid criticism of our opponents, and to relinquish at once, if such be found, every fallacious statement. My persuasion is, that the *popular feeling* is theirs, the *argument* ours: if an evidence of the latter were requisite, it might in part be deduced from the striking facts, that not only have the best pædobaptist writers made us repeated and most important concessions, while many, if not a majority of their living teachers, constantly admit one-half at least of our arguments for the *mode* of baptism; but their churches contain vast numbers of theoretic baptists, who have discernment enough to appreciate the force of evidence, but not piety enough to pursue the path of duty.

The Reply of Mr. M'Lean to Dr. Wardlaw, is a masterly performance. My own Answer was written before I had seen it, or indeed known of its existence; but, among other reasons for not subsequently suppressing that part of my present publication, it is, perhaps, sufficient to state, that, however meritorious, that work has scarcely been heard of in England; and a new discussion may have some tendency to excite an increased degree of attention to that part of the general subject, which our opponents have recently seized upon as their favourite position in the contested field; but whence, in my opinion, they can never give successful battle. There is another work on the subject, called "Eugenio and Epenetus," which is most worthy of a serious and careful perusal.



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THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF KING CHARLES THE FIRST

IN WHICH IS CONTAINED
A FULL AND COMPLETE HISTORY
OF HIS REIGN, FROM THE
BEGINNING OF HIS REIGN
UNTIL HIS DEATH, IN THE
YEAR OF HIS AGE SIXTY-ONE
AND ONE, IN THE YEAR OF
OUR LORD ONE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-ONE
BY SAMUEL JOHNSON, ESQ.
OF THE BARRISTERS AT LAW
IN THE TEMPLE



ON BAPTISM,

§c. §c.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

IN order to the clear comprehension of any subject, more especially when it involves a controverted topic, it is requisite, not only to consider it in its separate branches, but to ascertain its relative claims, and, if it belong to some general system, its comparative importance, and true position. Sometimes it may happen, that the only method of detecting the fallacy of an argument, which has been rendered plausible and imposing by the ingenious sophistries of an acute theorist, is to bring forward these primary and antecedent considerations, and by shewing its inconsistency as part of some great whole, deduce the fact, and ultimately lead to the exposure of the point of error: in every instance it is essential to the truth of a subject, that it should be capable of being shewn to be consistent both with itself, and with other ascertained and admitted facts or axioms, which constitute the basis of reasoning, and the

data of general knowledge. If this be not the case, the mind will be filled with constant hesitation—reasoning will be perplexed with endless contradictions—and moral principles and deductions become the sport of scepticism.

It is easy to conceive, that a particular point of discussion, or train of reasoning, when viewed apart, or in an insulated form, might fix an ascendant impression in a mind even of the highest intellectual order, which could only be removed by that mind being induced to take a more extensive survey of the field of argument. It might then appear, that previous prejudices had bewildered and led the judgment astray, which could only be recalled to its just exercise, and led to a legitimate conclusion, by dispelling, in this manner, such unhappy prepossessions, and by bringing from another quarter the full light of evidence. To determine, in fact, upon any question, however minute and comparatively insignificant, with a certainty that shall exclude doubt, or with a moral confidence that shall bespeak deliberate, judicious, and discriminating examination, it is necessary to extend our researches far beyond its own individual limits, and to take a comprehensive glance at other subsidiary and incidental topics of general inquiry. This is the only method of avoiding a hasty conclusion, an inconsistent theory, and the unhappy consequence of both, a party feeling.

Suppose, to take an illustration from nature, the construction, qualities, and uses of a *leaf* were under investigation. Whatever discoveries might

be made of its figure, colour, dimensions, and the arrangement of its minuter parts; it is obvious that the most careful and microscopic examination, and for the longest period, would furnish but a very inadequate notion of the purposes of its creation, and the particular position it held, and the relative value which attached to it in the universal system. Whether it were designed for protection or ornament, for the fruit, or the bird, or the beast, could not be ascertained, without a more general survey, and without knowing how and where it grew, and what was its comparative importance. A consideration of the branch to which it was appended, and the tree to which it belonged, with many other points, would be the only way of forming a just conclusion. We must understand the tree in order to be acquainted with the leaf, and the vegetable world at large to which it belongs must be, in some degree, comprehended, ere we could arrive at the particular truth of which we were in pursuit; and the errors which a limited inspection would naturally produce must be, and could only be corrected, by a more extended and general examination.

Baptism is a branch of the tree of scriptural knowledge; or, if you please, a leaf. If it be contemplated apart from its general connection, the investigation must necessarily be imperfect, and the deductions will be likely to be inconclusive. To understand the part, we must, in some measure, comprehend the whole. It belongs to a system, and its position must be ascertained; and whatever conceptions we form of it must be

harmonized with that great whole to which it is attached. Baptism is a rite of the Christian church; it is a part of Christianity; to understand the nature, design, and character of baptism, we must, therefore, understand Christianity; and must not only shew that it belongs to the system, but is, in its great purposes and principles, in harmony with that system. If our conception of the particular design and appointed practice of baptism do not accord with the essential principles of Christianity, there must somewhere exist a fallacy in our arguments; and even if it could not be proved that our reasonings or illustrations were inconsistent with each other, it would be sufficient to shew that they were incompatible with the great principles and foundation of our faith. There *must* be error; to this conclusion we are necessarily conducted *à priori*; the detection of it, then, becomes important. If it can be demonstrated, therefore, that pædobaptism is inharmonious with Christianity as a general system, this branch of the argument is established against it; and being so established, upon the subsequent detection of the inconsequential reasonings and fallacies of the minuter details of the subject, we are furnished with a powerful corroborative argument to strengthen and confirm us at every step of the refutation.

The baptismal controversy, as it is usually conducted, hinges upon the *mode* and *subjects* of baptism; and these are the points to which the present work is chiefly and necessarily devoted, as an answer to Mr. Ewing, Dr. Dwight, and

Dr. Wardlaw: but in my opinion our opponents lose much, and we proportionably gain, by considering the *practice* in connection with the *principle* of Christianity. This has seldom been attempted: it is, nevertheless, one of the most important branches of the inquiry, and must necessarily confirm any process of critical, historical, and argumentative discussion. To this point, then, I have determined to devote a few preliminary pages, from the conviction that it is very important, has been seldom elucidated, and is in every way confirmatory of our general sentiments.

Two questions here present themselves;—What is Christianity? and, What is Baptism as a part of Christianity?

Christianity, as a system of religion, whether viewed in its essential doctrines, precepts, and promises, or in its implantation as a principle and spring of eternal life through faith, must ever be considered as a *spiritual dispensation*. “The law was given by Moses, but *grace* and *truth* came by Jesus Christ;” and the Divine Author of our religion, when explaining its grand characteristic, declared, “My kingdom is not of this world.” Had he, in the construction of his religion, appealed to the senses, rather than the conscience and the judgment; had he instituted forms of worship, without requiring the service of the affections; had he united the state with the church, and himself assumed the sceptre of Augustus Cæsar, instead of exhibiting the better dominion, and ascending to the higher station of

Lord of Conscience; had he rendered it the proper object and aim of the first propagators of his Gospel to proselyte nations, rather than to convert souls, and to *establish religion*, rather than to build up “a *spiritual house* ;” had he desired them to coerce by the sword, rather than to convince by argument and evidence, and to acquire multitudes to join his standard, rather than to gain disciples who should learn his doctrine, and willing servants who, from devoted love, should obey his word;—then his kingdom would have been “*of this world*.” But no discussion is requisite to prove to those with whom my principal argument is concerned, that Christ has established a spiritual religion, and has combined the spirit and power of godliness with its outward forms; I have only to remind them of the fact, and request them to observe its bearings. Christianity is, as we have stated, a *spiritual dispensation*—a system of redeeming mercy exhibited to a fallen race, which had forfeited every hope, and merited “everlasting destruction”—a system which, consequently, from its very nature, addresses itself to intelligent creatures, capable of discerning its glory, appreciating its claims, and participating, through the exercise of faith and love, its invaluable blessings. If this dispensation or kingdom be viewed as *spiritual*, such must necessarily be its subjects. A spiritual kingdom cannot admit of other than spiritual subjects; the idea would be incongruous and absurd, as well as manifestly unscriptural; for when the subjects of this kingdom are described, they are represented, not only as

rational beings and moral agents, not only as intellectual and immortal, but as regenerate and holy—"born of God,"—"born of the Spirit,"—"believers,"—"disciples,"—"saints," and constituting the "body of Christ."

Hence it is, in the *personality* of religion, that we fix the very root of our argument. If there be one general consideration relating to the gospel of Jesus, more obvious, more essential, more clearly pervading all its statements, and entering more completely into its essence, than another, it is this, that man is individually responsible to God for his actions, and as such an object of appeal, entreaty, warning, and promise, eligible to an immortal destiny of woe and delight, of condemnation or salvation. In this there can be no substitution; one person can no more occupy another's situation, as a being responsible to God, than he can possess another's mind, and exercise the mental and moral faculties of another being. He can neither be righteous nor wicked, saved nor lost, for another. And hence it follows, that there can be no substitution of the *indications* of religion or of its acquirements, either with regard to faith or practice. No one can profess faith, no one can put on Christ, no one can obey God, no one can perform a duty which is enjoined as a public expression and avowal of any Christian principle, for another. The personality of the religion of Jesus, is surely its obvious peculiarity, and its most illustrious as well as indisputable distinction.

Christianity, however, does not merely consist of doctrines, precepts, and promises; but its

divine originator has incorporated with it, and rendered essential to its proper profession, the observance of two ordinances, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, by which all its genuine disciples are required to give a testimony to the world of *their* religion, and by a practical exhibition of its nature and influence to attract and win over to its practice the mass of mankind. Christianity being a spiritual dispensation, and the observance of its precepts and ordinances, involving, and indeed demanding, the exercise of devout and holy passions—of faith, and love, and joy in God, “by whom we have received the reconciliation;”—the service is not only of a *personal* kind, but eminently *spiritual*: a peculiar elevation and refinement of soul, a consecration of all the mental and moral faculties, the presentation of the whole man as a “living sacrifice” upon the altar of duty, “holy, acceptable to God, which is our *reasonable* service,”—all are distinctly required, and all tacitly admitted to be given, by the very act of participation in the observance of religion. When the disciples of Christ sit down together at the sacramental festival, these considerations, it is *universally* allowed, enter essentially into the idea of its proper celebration. They approach that board as willing and welcome guests; and by cultivating and expressing devout remembrance of Christ, and impassioned love to him as their Redeemer, “shew forth his death till he come.” There they enjoy “the feast of friendship and the flow of souls.” There they put forth all the vigour of personal religion—all the energy of a

sanctified mind; and that commemorative institution displays the *rationality* as well as the *ardour* of true piety, and its own perfect accordance with the *entire system* of the gospel, in relation to the *understanding* and the *heart* of man.

Hitherto, then, it appears, that Christianity is founded upon the consideration of moral agency and personal responsibility, its requirements presuppose capability and obligation with regard to its disciple; for, although one principal rite only has been selected for the illustration of this sentiment, an equally convincing evidence might have been adduced from the other ordinance of the Christian church, which is placed on a similar footing with the Lord's Supper. What, it may be inquired, from our antecedent impressions, from the knowledge we had acquired of the genius of Christianity after a careful examination of its principles and institutions, would be and ought to be our anticipations of the *character* of a rite, appointment, or service, which was about to be for the first time announced, or for the first time to become the subject of particular inquiry? Would it be natural to expect that it should *harmonize* in its principle, nature, and design, with the other sacred institutions of the system, or that it should essentially *differ* from them; or if there were some points of general agreement, that it should evolve a *new principle*, in some considerable degree *at variance* with those *previously established*, and even at variance with what must be allowed still to form the general *basis and reason of its own observance*? If, for instance, all the established and admitted prin-

ciples of Christianity, and all the other regulations it imposed, required the operation of a certain feeling, or the manifestation of a general qualifying disposition in the individual, or the class of persons directed to practise the ordinances in question, is it presumable, that with regard to the new institution, the same qualification should *not* be required, or merely required *in part*, or of *some* of those only who were to observe the appointment: thus placing the observers of the rite *upon a different footing from each other*, and rendering that rite itself questionable in its character, dubious in its features, and anomalous in its design? Could it be supposed that *every other institution* demanded the exercise of the reason, the judgment, the conscience, and that even *Christianity itself* could only be received through the medium of the *affections*—and yet that neither reason, judgment, conscience, nor affection, were necessary to the due observance of this other, and *only of this other rite*? And could it be supposed, that while all other observances required *personal religion*, this was practicable by those who were morally *incapable of religion*, or that it might be practised *upon* them solely on the ground of the qualifications for the service which any of their *relatives or friends* might possess—when especially it is to be remarked, that the *entire reason* of its being practised *at all*, was founded upon a consideration of *personal obligation*, and was instituted to express a *personal dedication to God*? Ought we not, in such a case, either to question the *fact* of the introduction of such an appoint-

ment into the system, otherwise consistent and harmonious in all its enactments, regulations, and principles—or, to conclude, that we have *misconceived* and *misinterpreted* the law?

We are thus led to the true answer to our second inquiry—*What is baptism as a part of Christianity?* Is it of an anomalous character—partly Jewish, and partly Christian, in principle—partly personal, and partly relative—partly congruous, and partly incongruous, with the general system? Are some to receive it because they *believe*, and others because they are *related* to those that believe? Are some to be baptized on a profession of faith, and for *this reason only*, that they *do profess it*—and others without such a profession, and when incapable from their infant age of any moral obligation, or any personal duty? Were this the case, baptism must stand alone—it is not analogous to any other institution—it is not accordant with the general principles and the spirit of Christianity—it is without precedent in the example of Christ, and in the admitted practice of the Apostles in the adult baptisms recorded in the New Testament—it is a mere appendage to Christianity, not a part of the system—it is in some cases significant, in others not so—it may be “a putting on Christ,” or it may be a mere external badge—nay, rather, a momentary indication that the individual receiving it is—What? A disciple? No.—A worshipper? No.—An heir of glory? No.—One who is “buried with Christ,” and who rises with him to “newness of life?” No—but an indication that the individual is *related* to the Christian professor, and his rela-

tionship is supposed to constitute a right to the reception which, in the case of the infant recipient confers no benefit, prevents no evil, and contains no moral obligation—and with the assured conviction, in the mind of the whole party concerned in the anomalous transaction, that the baptized individual, not only *cannot then* profess Christianity, but may be its future OPPONENT and DESPISER!

Most perfectly therefore do I agree with the statement of my valued friend, Mr. Birt, in his pamphlet, entitled “Adult Baptism;” and in his words I conclude this preliminary discussion:—

“It is the very essence of religion which constitutes the ground on which our brethren are at issue, both with themselves and with us; and until they prove that our Lord has established two kinds of religion—the one *relative*, which they insist on at the baptism of infants, the other *personal*, which, with us, they maintain in all other religious ordinances—the one proceeding from man, the other the work of God—the one evinced by the graces of the Holy Spirit, the other existing without evidence—the subjects of the one, moral and accountable agents, of the other, babes incapable of responsibility—the character of the one being in conformity to the revealed will of God, and the other so entirely destitute of all character as to be perfect neutrality—until this be done, they have really effected nothing.”

ON THE NEW EXPLANATION OF TERMS PRO-
POSED BY MR. EWING.

THAT part of the controverted subject of Baptism which relates to the spiritual design of the institution, is always the favourite topic of ministerial discourse in the denomination to which I have the pleasure to belong; but as our Pædobaptist brethren are “ever and anon” urging us by their publications to pursue the beaten track of etymological disquisition, we feel it incumbent upon us, for the truth’s sake, occasionally to follow in the same direction. While their critical and theological writers continue to attack us with their *ἔπεα πτερόεντα* and *οἰστοὶ ῥιγηλοὶ*—with “winged words” and “terrific shafts,” the multitude never fail to interpret silence on our part into a consciousness of defeat; and if we actually *do* not reply to often-answered statements, or to novel and ingenious subtleties, it is supposed we *cannot* or *dare not* advance into the arena. If religion and religious duty were not deeply implicated, and if we did not feel solicitous that every consideration which the utmost learning and skill could adduce ought to be fairly and thoroughly investi-

gated, we should allow representations of this kind to pass *sub silentio*, nor turn aside from the course of ordinary engagement. Reflecting, however, on the general importance of the subject, I have taken up the pen, from the hope that the interests of truth and piety may be in some measure promoted. Observing the mild and friendly spirit that pervades Mr. Ewing's publication, the ardent desire of the writer is to manifest, what he is conscious of possessing, a similar feeling; and he cannot help congratulating the Christian world on the kind and pious tone which, notwithstanding strong appeals and admissible pleasantries, has of late been introduced into the discussion of controverted subjects.

Etymological disquisition I have called a *beaten* track; and it is often deemed a *barren* one; but in the present instance we are invited into a new path, which, for this reason, is unusually attractive. Whether we are going to tread on *firm* ground, and whether we can safely trust our *guide*, must be afterwards ascertained; we shall at least be bold enough to adventure a few steps.

Mr. E. is "persuaded that the word *baptize* has never yet been properly analyzed." Under the influence of this persuasion he very naturally enters upon this task; and had he really succeeded we should most readily have united in his triumphant Εὐρηκα, instead of excepting against it as a premature exultation. He writes thus;—

"The following are admitted as general rules for reducing words to their first principles. Let

those letters and syllables which are merely the signs of derivation and inflection, be cut off. Let intermediate vowels, employed for the purpose of enunciating consonants, be disregarded, or considered as easily changeable into one another. Let those consonants, also, which are pronounced by the same organ of speech (as the lips, the teeth or the palate,) be freely interchanged, as we find them actually to be in the practice of speaking. That part of the word which remains unvaried after these operations, falls to be considered as the radical term. Apply these rules to the words in question. Discard the terminations, and you have the syllable *bap*; change the intermediate vowel *a* into *o*, and the labial consonant *b* into the labial consonant *p*, and you have the term *pop*, which is the root required." p. 22.

"Will the reader, then, have the goodness to accustom his ear to the following sounds? *Pop-to*, *pop-tizo*, *pop-tistes*, *pop-tos*, *pop-tismos*, and *pop-tisma*. In this identical form the root occurs, in Greek, in Latin, and in English. In Greek we have ποπύξω, *I blow, hiss, or whistle, cheer my horse by calling to him or patting him with my hand, stroke, or applaud*; also the nouns πόπυσμα and ποπυσμός, *a puff, hiss, or whistle, a smack or gentle sound with mouth or hands, expression of favour, applause, cheering, or soothing, a gentle stroke, a soft blow with the hand*. In like manner *poppysmus* and *poppysma* in Latin, which are the same words as those just mentioned in Greek, and of the same signification. In English the term *pop* is thus explained by Dr. Johnson."—(Then follows a quota-

tion of the several explanations and illustrations in his Dictionary.) p. 24.

“ Mr. Walker, after giving in his Dictionary Johnson’s explanation of *pop*, adds, ‘ undoubtedly derived from the noise caused by the sudden *expulsion* of some small body.’ This is true, but it is only part of the truth ; for the word *pop* applies equally to the noise caused by the sudden *impulsion* of some small body. In short, it is the noise caused by the *agency of body in motion upon body*, and that *in any direction whatever*. It may be *entrance* or *exit*, *ascent* or *descent*. We say, to *pop in*, to *pop out*, to *pop forth* ; to *pop up*, or to *pop down* ; to *pop into* ; to *pop upon* ; to *pop out of*, or *out from* ; to *pop off*. I have to add, that the word is not limited in its application to solids or to the aerial fluid, but is with equal frequency applied to water, or any other fluid whatever. Finally, though a *pop* may be sometimes so powerful that the noise shall be startling, it is generally caused by the stroke of a small body ; and hence it is usually so slight and gentle, that the noise, though marked in the very sound of the word, comes in fact to be commonly nothing at all.” p. 26.

“ Keep in mind, now, the above explanation, and apply it to baptism, (*pop-tism*,) and you are furnished with a key which will naturally and consistently account for all its much disputed acceptations. You have only to observe, that a person or thing may be either *popped into* water or any other fluid, or may have water or any other fluid *popped upon*, or *popped into* him or it, and the whole mystery vanishes.” p. 27.

No one can deny, after entertaining himself with these passages, that our author has *popped upon* a very amusing, if not a very convincing etymology; but one is tempted to use the words of an Homeric stanza, though with a different application,—

Οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀχνύμενοί περ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺν γέλασαν·

i. e. Although distressed, they *smiled pleasantly* upon him;—for though it is to be regretted that a person of learning and various attainment should have allowed himself to treat this subject so ludicrously, yet it produces no emotion of anger; and were it not for the intimate association of the novel criticism with important truth, we should suffer it to pass with only the expression of “a pleasant smile.” It is necessary to keep in mind, that for an explanation of ποπ, *pop*, we have at full length the definitions and illustrations of *Johnson's English Dictionary!*

Suppose, then, we first proceed in our author's own manner. He admits, that by the same rule the root may be pronounced *bob* or *bab*. This, indeed, is obvious; for—Discard the terminations, and you have the syllable *bap*; change the vowel *a* into *o*, and the labial consonant *p* into the labial consonant *b*, and you have the term *bob*, which is the root required. Will the reader, then, have the goodness to accustom his ear to the following sounds? *Bob-to*, *bob-tizo*, *bob-tistes*, *bob-tos*, *bob-tismos*, and *bob-tisma*. In English the word *bob* is thus explained by Dr. Johnson:—

To BOB. *v. n.* To play backward and forward;
to play loosely against any thing.

And sometimes lurk I in a gossip's bowl,
In very likeness of a roasted crab;
And when she drinks against her lips I *bob*,
And on her withered dewlap pour the ale.

Shakspeare's Midsummer Night's Dream.

They comb, and then they order every hair;
A birth-day jewel *bobbing* at each ear. *Dryden.*

I'm rich in jewels, rings, and *bobbing* pearls,
Pluck'd from Moor's ears. *Dryden.*

It is not necessary to cite all the explanations and references, after the example of Mr. Ewing with regard to the word *pop*; since we are at present only in search of an illustration, to afford the reader some general idea of the curious method he has adopted, and since the authority in question is universally accessible. Now, to pursue our author's strain, "having thus translated the word *baptism*, we are prepared to shew that it signifies the sudden and slight application of water or some other liquid; but, in a more lax sense, the application of it in any manner, or for any purpose;" or rather the application of a *solid*, ("for the word is not limited in its application to *fluids*,") the slight application to the lips or the neck, so as to resemble, for instance, the jogging of the elbow when a person is drinking, (*vide* example from Shakspeare,) or the motion of an earring. Hence, in fact, baptism may be *bobbing in any way*. "It is not always that the analysis is of so easy and satisfactory a nature!"

By the rules already laid down, our root may be pronounced *vap*; and “in Latin,” as Dr. Murray remarks, “*vap*, wet, blow, ventilate, cool, dry by the wind, or produce evaporation by exposure to the air, produced *vap-or*, in Greek *atmos*, from *at*, blow.”* In this we may feel a little perplexed to determine whether the proper action is to *dry*, or to *wet*, or to *blow*; some one might perhaps ingeniously conjecture that a *vapour bath* is intended! In the present instance I am unable to find the verb *to vap* in Johnson; but he gives us *to vapour*, which, amongst other significations, is said to mean to *brag*, and also to *scatter in fume or vapour*. Perhaps a certain reviewer had *both* these explanations in his eye when he wrote—“The body of evidence which the author has adduced *completely overthrows* the doctrine of immersion;”—that is, *vaps*, *vapours*, or *evaporates* it!

The convenience of this term is surprising; for, as a witty friend has observed,—Discard the terminations, and you have the syllable *bap*; change the intermediate vowel *a* into *o*, and the labial consonant *b* into the labial consonant *m*, and you have the term *mòp*, which is the root required. This derivation possesses the *confirmatory* circumstance, that (*Johnson* also being witness,) we can go to the *Latin* language and find *mappa*, and (ourselves being judges,) to the *Greek* also, where we happily discover *μαπέειν* *per Syncop.* for *μαρπέειν*; from *μαρπτο*, *capiro*, *prehendo*, *to take*,

* See Mr. E.'s note on page 23 of his Essay.

that is, *in any way*; and metonymically, *to surprise*. Hence to *marp*, or *map*, or *mop*, may be to take a person or child, and *surprise* him by *popping upon* or *moptizing* his face with water. I am indisposed to pursue the ludicrous applications of this new term, but they may be easily conceived.

There is something, however, which I beg to submit to Mr. Ewing's critical acumen. He has certainly not made the most of his discovery; for by simply changing the labial consonant *b* into the labial *p*, we have *pap*, as the root required; which would surely seem, by the very sound as well as the sense, to point to the subjects of the ordinance. The idea of *infants* must immediately occur; or, if we press the Greek and Latin into our service, we have the parents and sires. Of this our celebrated lexicographer will again bear testimony. His explanations are as follow:—

PAPA. *n. s.* παπᾱς; Lat. *papa*. A fond name for father, used in many languages.

PAP. *n. s.* Food made for infants, with bread boiled in water.

It might, perhaps, place the question of etymology in a still stronger light, were we to select another Greek term, and apply the proposed system in a similar manner. I had thought of attempting this, as a further exposure of its fallacy; but the critical observations about to be introduced, will supersede the necessity of resorting to this method.

I have felt some inclination, also, for the sake of my mere English readers, to try the merits of the modern verb *TO HOAX*; and had even thought

of descanting upon the *vulgar hoax*, the *political hoax*, the *literary hoax*, and, lastly, the CRITICAL HOAX; but lest I should be accused of a severe personality, I at once forbear.

Ridicule, it may be said, is not the proper test of truth, or the certain means of detecting sophistry. Of this I am perfectly aware; and should be sorry indeed to resort to it as the only or the best method of confuting error in the present controversy. It is for this reason I here cut short my sarcastic animadversions; craving the reader's forgiveness for the brief indulgence of that risibility which, not only the quaintness, but the extreme futility (as will soon be shewn,) of our author's etymological attempts have irresistibly excited.

The novel theory presented to our attention appears to have been devised for the purpose of supporting a favourite hypothesis; it is, however, liable to numerous objections, of which it will be proper to mention a few.

I. *In instituting his analysis, our author seems to have no very distinct conceptions of his own ultimate aim, but to feel great indecision of mind respecting the SCOPE and OBJECT of the operation which he has undertaken to perform.* Some of his remarks imply a wish to discover the primary form of the word in question, to which the term *root* is generally applied by grammarians; but there occur other observations, wholly irreconcilable with the supposition that such is his purpose. Of this latter class we have an instance, p. 23, where he represents himself as supported by Aristotle.

“ I plead for no innovation, but am supported by the ancient and high authority of Aristotle. Στοιχείον μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος· οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνετὴ γίνεσθαι φωνή· καὶ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν ἀδιαίρετοι φωναὶ, ὧν οὐδεμίαν λέγω στοιχείον.—περὶ ποιητικῆς, κεφ. κ. “ The root (of a word) then, is an undivided sound: not every such sound, however; but one that is significant: for cries of beasts also are undivided sounds, but I do not say that any of them is a root.” p. 23, 24.

To give a just view of the case, it will be necessary to cite the passage at somewhat greater length, and also to correct some errors of translation into which Mr. Ewing has fallen. Aristotle is speaking of *diction* or *elocution*; the chapter is entitled Περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν αὐτῆς μερῶν, and he proceeds thus; —Τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης τὰδ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη· στοιχείον, συλλαβὴ, σύνδεσμος, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, ἄρθρον, πῶσις, λογος. Στοιχείον μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος· ἡ πᾶσα δὲ, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνετὴ γίνεσθαι φωνή· καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν ἀδιαίρετοι φωναὶ, ὧν οὐδεμίαν λέγω στοιχείον. Ταύτης δὲ μέρη, το, τε χωνῆεν, καὶ τὸ ἡμίφωνον καὶ ἄφωνον. Ἔστι δὲ φωνῆεν μὲν, ἄνευ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ακουστήν· οἶον, τὸ α καὶ ω. Ἡμίφωνον δὲ, τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ακουστήν· οἶον, τὸ σ, καὶ τὸ ρ. Ἀφωνον δὲ, τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχον φωνήν, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνήν γινόμενον ακουστὸν· οἶον, τὸ γ, καὶ τὸ δ. Ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασί τε τοῦ στόματος, καὶ τόποις, καὶ δασύτητι, καὶ ψιλότητι, καὶ μήκει, καὶ βραχύτητι· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὀξύτητι, καὶ βαρύτητι, καὶ τῷ μέσῳ· περὶ ὧν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν. Συλλαβὴ δὲ ἐστι φωνὴ ἄσημος, συνθετὴ ἐξ ἀφώνου καὶ φωνῆς ἔχοντος. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ γρ ἄνευ τῶν α συλλαβὴ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦ α· οἶον, τὸ γρα. κ. τ. λ. “ Of all diction (speech or elocution,) these are

the parts ;—element, (or letter,) syllable, conjunction, noun, verb, article, case, and sentence. An element, then, is an indivisible sound : not every such sound, however ; but one which has conduced to the forming of an intelligible sound, (or word) ; for there are indivisible sounds of beasts, but I by no means say any of them is an element. Of this the parts are, the vowels, semi-vowels, and mutes. A vowel is that which, *without* any addition, has an audible sound, as *a* and *o* ; a semi-vowel is that which, in composition, is also itself audible, as *s* and *r* ; a mute is that which, in combination, having itself no sound, audibly modifies the sounds of other letters, as *g* and *d*. These differ in the conformation of the mouth, (required for their pronunciation,) in their positions, in being aspirated and unaspirated, and in length, and in shortness ; also in their being acute, grave, and between the two. The inquiry respecting these, severally, belongs to the subject of *metres*. A syllable is a sound without signification, composed of a consonant and a vowel ; for the letters *gr*, without *a*, form a syllable, and with *a*, as *gra*," &c.

Having given the passage from Aristotle in its connection, let us now inquire, to what purpose it has been adduced by our author ? That any suffrage of the ancient philosopher is given to Mr. E.'s method of analysis, by which his present conclusions are sanctioned, will surely not be contended ; and from its utter irrelevancy to any such end, we infer, could never have been designed ; although the manner of its introduction was calculated to

occasion this misconception. But as no other purpose appears answered by this quotation in Mr. E.'s pages, it would seem that his intention was to point out a coincidence between his own views and those of Aristotle with regard to an ultimate part of a word; this is obvious also from his having rendered στοιχείον *a root*. But the slightest attention to the language will shew that στοιχείον, in the Greek sentence, is not to be understood of a grammatical root, but of an *elementary letter*. If, therefore, the scope of our author's analytical labours be the same with the element of the Peripatetic philosopher, he has prematurely stopped short in his enterprize. *Pop* cannot be the sound, because it is not the element to which the ultimate etymology proceeds; this would be one of the letters or undivided sounds π , σ , β , α , or some of their interchangeable vowels or consonants.* If, on the other hand, he quits Aristotle, and adopts the

* M. Dacier, in his notes on Aristotle, explains his statement in a manner that corroborates our objection. He says—“Les Grecs appellent les lettres d'un mot qui signifie les elemens, pour faire entendre, que comme tous les corps sont composés des elemens, et se dissolvent dans les mêmes principes, il en est de même de tous les mots, ils sont formés des lettres, et retournent dans ces mêmes lettres, quand ils sont détruits. Puisque la lettre est un element c'est donc un son indivisible, car tout son qui peut être divisé ne peut être une lettre; comme tout corps composé ne peut être un element; mais pour définir la lettre, il ne suffit pas de dire qu'elle est un son indivisible, c'est pourquoi Aristote ajoute, *mais celui qui est articulé et intelligible*, c'est à dire, qui signifie quelque chose; car la voix des bêtes est un son indivisible; mais parce qu'elle ne peut rien signifier, elle n'est pas une lettre.”

common idea of the term *root*, he has proceeded much too far; inasmuch as $\pi\sigma\pi$ is no Greek word whatever, and the verb in the present tense, $\beta\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega$, has all the appearance of the theme to which the other tenses are reducible: or if we seek a simpler form, it will be presently shewn how it may be legitimately traced.

II. *What are designated "GENERAL RULES for reducing words to their first principles," and which are presumed to give validity to the results of the proposed analysis, are utterly unavailable for the purpose.* That "intermediate vowels" are "easily changeable," and that "those consonants which are pronounced by the same organ of speech," may be "freely interchanged," (or, rather *have been*) need not be disputed; but how this fact became a *rule* for the author's proceeding, is inconceivable! A rule, being a practical direction, necessarily assumes certain things upon the existence of which depends the propriety of its observance; a rule clearly being no rule, except so far as the circumstances in which it may be adopted, are known and definable. But we are not furnished with the slightest assistance to enable us to form an idea of the essential circumstances in the present instance. On the supposition, that these changes are at all times equally eligible, it may be asked why, when our author has subjected *bap* to his process, he should stop short; or why the new syllable *pop* is not equally susceptible of being changed back again to its primæval form?

It may be further remarked, that the term "*general*," while it sometimes signifies *frequency of*

occurrence, in other instances denotes *comprehension of particulars*; if its present use were intended in the latter sense, it implies what is contrary to fact. That the changes in question do occur, has been admitted, but they are far from being comprehensive, though *wide and loose* enough to sustain an ambiguity. So little applicable, therefore, is the designation "general rules," to that which consistently with fact may be meant, that we trust, upon perceiving their tendency to produce a most erroneous impression, our author will, for the future, discard them. In the mean time, we must insist, that they have absolutely accomplished nothing, and cannot be exempted from the charge of utter futility.

III. *Our author's professed analysis is unsupported by the principles which are essential to verify a philological hypothesis.* With regard to these principles, our author leaves us entirely to conjecture, although without any such essential data, he determines, *ex cathedra*, that "the analysis is not always of so easy and satisfactory a nature." The verification of an analysis surely depends on the two following conditions, at least:—

1. That the word adduced as a root should be an integral part of the language. All legitimate induction in philology, no less than in universal science, issues in *fact*. In vain do we reason and analyze, if we arrive at no elementary and agreed truth. The *fact* at which analysis must necessarily aim in the present and in other similar instances is, *a word existing* in the lan-

guage to which our investigations refer. This is virtually conceded, when it is said, that the root is a sound that is *significant*, and “not every sound;” since upon what principle it can be maintained, that a word is *significant* in a language where it does not in reality *exist*, is utterly inconceivable. But the professed radical *pop* is neither shewn to be found in Greek, nor in any cognate language.

2. The changes for which the etymologist pleads, must have the evidence of competent *authority*. The alterations proposed, and a thousand others with which a catalogue of terms might be swelled, are allowed to be *possible*; but the *possible* and the *real*, that which was *supposable*, and that which is *fact*, do not so nearly approximate, that they can be regarded as identical. It was *possible*, that the change proposed might be made; as what change is not possible? But the authority which proves the fact is necessary to decide *which* of the numberless possibilities *has been realized*. Should it be imagined, that whatever change was possible in a word, may be assumed to have taken place; and that, without any other restraint on wild conjecture, than the very inefficient and useless one of a required coincidence in some one abstract idea—we put it to the author to consider, how short is the time during which he is likely to remain the last discoverer in this part of the etymological field—how soon his views will be superseded by other novelties? We put it to him to consider, what valuable attribute of language could survive the general adoption of this ety-

mological licentiousness? The demand must then be renewed for *the authority* in this question. What Greek author has used synonymously the different words attempted to be identified? What RECORD exists of the change asserted? What poet, what historian, what grammarian, what Greek scholiast, will come to our author's assistance from the "vasty deep" of departed time? Till some evidence of this description be produced, he may indeed furnish amusement to those who can be entertained by the play of fancy, but he affords no assistance to those who would inquire after truth.

Without the two conditions which have now been mentioned, no analysis can be verified as arriving at a *root* even in the least comprehensive notion of that term; which is *merely* a certain combination of elementary sounds with a signification. A root of this kind must however be so barren a root for argument in the baptismal controversy, that it could hardly have been deemed worthy of the author's attention, if he had not viewed it as essentially retaining its first signification, through all the subsequent changes of form. The theory, that a radical meaning invariably attends a radical form, is the only one which can be of much use in discovering the meaning of a term in a disputed instance. Without inquiring whether the argument in which we now engage be general, or merely *ad hominem*, we must urge a reasonable claim that the deductions be clear, as the pretensions are high and important.

That particular evidence of a true derivation

which consists in a coincidence of some one idea in the acknowledged word, and a supposed derivative, will necessarily depend on the nature of the common idea as to the part it forms of the whole meaning—as to its being a *leading idea*—one which, if it do not obtrude itself into each subsequently acquired meaning of the word, can, however, in no instance be difficult of discovery—one which is of a kind to exclude others from all equality of rank and pretensions with itself. Where there is a failure in these requirements, where the supposed radical idea is so general that it must of necessity enter into half the words of a language, and consequently, is so small a part of the meaning in most, as to require a most acute perception to detect its presence, it must, in such instances, be essentially destitute of any intelligible force of evidence for the purpose in view.

Of the latter description is the instance we have recently had proposed. The radical meaning which seems first to present itself in our author's analysis, is that of a sound, from which it becomes a body in motion, yet a diminutive body: this restriction being struck off, it remains "the motion of a body on a body," that is to say, it is *motion*; the motion of one substance upon another. Now let the reflection for a moment be admitted, that this idea is one which is implied in almost every active verb, and we may at once appreciate its value as evidence in the present instance. Depending on the recurrence of an *abstract idea of motion of body on body*, as evidence of derivation, we shall ultimately find there

is some root of such prodigious fertility that a very few such would be requisite in any language.

The case is quite different where the alleged idea is of obvious prominence. That, for example, in which lexicographers have so generally agreed, as the radical idea of the word now under discussion, namely, *immersion*, or *covering a body with liquid*, is precisely of this description. Although the possibility is not denied, of finding other words which imply a similar idea, it may safely be asserted, that in no other is it in any comparable degree prominent: in its full force and obviousness, it belongs to this alone.

It is rather a curious fact, illustrating however how slightly our author's general notion belongs to the word with which he would unite it, that he is himself a witness of its being employed to render a synonymous term, the first meaning of which, as adduced on his own page, is "I stand." The original word, from which *Βάπτω* is derived, is, he informs us, עָמַד; adding, that in all probability it was the very word, in the Syro-Chaldaic dialect, used by John the Baptist, as the name of the new ordinance which he administered; the very word used by the messengers from Jerusalem when they asked, "Why baptizest thou?" The very word used by the Apostles and Evangelists, as long as they preached in Judea, Galilee, and Samaria. Admitting this statement, let us inquire, what is the signification of עָמַד? If, indeed, it be found to mean "the agency of body IN MOTION upon body," the correspondence would seem to invest the argument from the radical idea with some

degree of plausibility; but Mr. Ewing declares, and I am on no account inclined to dispute it, that *מַעַם* signifies TO STAND, CONTINUE, SUBSIST, to cause, or make TO STAND! It will require some labour to reconcile this contradiction; besides, in the administration of the ordinance in question, there can be neither “standing,” nor “causing to stand.”

IV. *The admission of Mr. Ewing's principle of etymology would introduce the utmost uncertainty into language.* If it were allowable to discard one syllable, and change *every letter* of another, the very foundations of intelligible speech would be broken up, and the confusion of Babel be introduced into every region of knowledge; words would no longer constitute the proper medium for the transmission of ideas; they might mean any thing or nothing:—facts the most certain might be disproved; testimony the most perspicuous might be overthrown; history the most important might be annulled! It would be only to *pop* upon some radical or supposed radical letter or letters, and the interested scribe or the subtle controversialist, by discarding one syllable and altering the expression of another, attacking the labial consonants or exploding the poor insignificant vowels, might answer his own purpose—toss about the apple of discord, or completely *pop-pize* (*ποππύζω*) *blow* or *hiss* away the documents of past ages with a *puff* (*πόππυσμα*). Is it possible that language should be so indefinite? And is it either judicious or correct thus to alarm the religious world with the critical tocsin? In reality, such would be the inevitable effect produced upon

the construction of language, were the proposed transformations and distortions admissible, that *a priori*, this method of investigation must be pronounced essentially and radically erroneous, although it were adopted by all the grammarians in the universe.

V. *If there be any real signification in the alleged Greek formation ποπ, it is perfectly different from the English verb to pop.* The analogy is entirely in the sound. The most obvious original compound into which it enters is ποππύζω, for the meaning of which we readily accept of our opponent's definition, *I blow, hiss, or whistle, cheer my horse by calling to him, or patting him with my hand, stroke, or applaud.* In the same form we have the interjection πόποι, which is expressive either of applause or indignation. To the English reader, then, it is quite sufficient to propose the question, whether there be any such resemblance between the applications of our term *pop* and the *whistling of a boy, the blowing of the wind, or the patting of a horse*, as to substantiate the alleged correspondence? and whether, above all, there can be imagined any kind of analogy between these and *the mode of administering a Christian ordinance?*—It would require much less ingenuity than our author possesses to prove the identity of the terms used by *the English and the Grecian drivers!*

Unless it were a mere oversight, there would appear disingenuousness in the attempt to palm an English term upon us, as explanatory of an original Greek particle, and to make the English applications of an English word at so considerable

a distance of time, the rule of determining the elementary construction of a minute syllable in a long departed language! It is, in fact, reversing the whole principle of etymology, which is, to treat the *modern* languages as derived from the *ancient*, and not the *ancient* from the *modern*; it is, moreover, substituting *sound* for *sense*.

VI. *Were the attempt to press the imaginary root in question into the consideration of the elements of the word Baptism, as successful as it is vain and futile, no single point would be gained.*—Admit that *bapto* is *popto*, and that *baptism* is *poptism*; admit that *to pop*, is *to pop in*, *to pop out*, *to pop forth*, *to pop up*, or *to pop down*, *to pop into*, *to pop upon*, *to pop out of*, or *out from*, *to pop off*; is the great etymological question determined? Is there less variety in the senses of the term *poptism* than in those of *baptism*? Is the original *idea*, or is the original practice ascertained better than before Mr. Ewing *popped upon* us with his critical alchemy, and pretended to the discovery of the *grand secret*? By whatever name we designate the institution, it leaves untouched the question of the mode and subjects of baptism; and decides nothing with regard to apostolic practice. Instead of saying that John or the disciples of Christ *baptized* the people, Mr. Ewing insists upon our saying that he *poptized them*: be it so—in christian courtesy, were it not at least for the ludicrous sound of the expression, we should be willing to adopt it: but then the enquiry remains, what is *poptism*? Is it *popping in* or *into*, or *under* or *upon*? Oh, says Mr. Ewing, it is *popping upon* and *upon the face*.

I assure you that *poptizo* signifies, I pop water upon the “*turned-up face*” of the person poptized : I have consulted *Johnson’s Dictionary*, and he quotes *once* from *Addison*, and *once* from *L’Estrange* to show that the verb *to pop* in certain cases means to *pop upon* ; and this English sense is the undoubted radical notion of the Greek syllable $\pi\omicron\pi$, which has, moreover, the very *sound* of our own native word ; and, believe me, “*it is not always that the analysis is of so easy and satisfactory a nature!*!!”

Now, some persons might happen to observe, that the far greater number of explanations given by Johnson really support the notion of the advocates of immersion ; for call it *poptizing* or *baptizing in or into, or out of, or from, or up or down*, IMMERSION and EMERSION are still implied !

Before, however, our author’s suggestions are so entirely rejected, he may, perhaps, demand a better etymology. Although it is by no means necessary for the vindication of our doctrine, and mode of baptism, to obey this summons ; yet we have no objection to direct the inquirer to a derivation which is supported by no inconsiderable authority : it is found in the *Lexicon Etymologicum Græcum* of the Rev. John Harmar, appended to Scapula’s *Lexicon*. “*Βάπτω, mergo, tingo, à βάω et πίπτω, cado. Qui mergitur it in aquam cadendo. Hinc βαπτίζειν, aquá tingere ; Anglicè, to baptise, id est, leviter immergere.*” Mr. Harmar was Greek Professor in the University of Oxford during the Commonwealth, but was ejected at the Restoration. Anthony Wood styles him “ an

excellent Grecian—a most excellent philologist.”*

Another, and perhaps, preferable etymology, may be mentioned; but whether the derivation be from βάω, which signifies *entrance into*, and πίπτω, or rather πέτω, which conveys the idea of *falling*, or *descending into*, or from βάω only; the term βάπτω, be it compounded, or simple and elementary, suggests in its earliest form, an idea eminently favourable to our mode of baptism.

“ Βάπτω, ψω, *mergo, lavo, tingo*. Quæ merguntur, eunt cadendo; ut possit esse à βάώ et πέλω *cado*. Propriùs; teguntur liquore, recepta in apertam cavitatem. Ergo à βύειν πολῶ: et βυπτειν quoque est pro βάπτειν et כַּוִּי Heb. est *cavum*: unde כַּכָּ *foramen, ostium*. Aut quia mersa in profundum eunt, ἄβαθύ. Sed concludamus βάπτω esse simpliciter à βάώ et significare *ingredi facio in humorem*. Quod tingo: ingredi facio in colorem. Sic δύνω *ingredior, mergor*. Jnv. gl. lyr. ἐμβιβάζω *imbuo*. Ita ergo à βάώ βάπτω, ut ab ἰέω ἰάκτω. Clariora hæc erunt, si referamus ad Hebræum כָּמ quod est *venit, ivit, abiit, etiam occidit*. Sic solem occidere est כָּמ.”†

The signification of a Greek term is to be determined by the testimony of the best critics and lexicographers, in connection with the primitive and current uses by the most approved writers in the language. That these authorities are univer-

* Vid. ATHENÆ OXONIENSIS, vol. ii. p. 478; and PALMER'S *Noncon. Mem.* vol. ii. p. 265.

† MATTHIÆ MARTINII *Etymologicum*, Bremæ, 1625.

sally in favour of immersion, every reader may convince himself by a simple inspection of the Lexicons. In the Septuagint, βάπτω is frequently introduced as a translation of the Hebrew word טבל which unquestionably means to dip or immerse. The term is uniformly employed in the Rabbinical laws for the admission of proselytes, which was by immersion; and it is a rule with the Jews, “wherever in the law, washing of the flesh or the clothes is mentioned, it means nothing else than טבילה כל הנק, *Tebileth col hagoph*, the dipping of the whole body in a laver; for “if any man dips himself all over, except the tip of his little finger, he is still in his uncleanness.”* My friend, Dr. Newman, has recorded a conversation which he once held with Professor PORSON, in company with a “much respected friend,” and which, as a corroborative testimony of no mean consideration, may properly be inserted in this place. It is with melancholy pleasure I add of that friend, (now, alas, no more!) that he was also dear to my heart, even from the days of early companionship at school, and that he was eminently distinguished for his attainments. “Not long before the death of Professor PORSON, I went, in company with a much respected friend, to see that celebrated Greek scholar at the London Institution. I was curious to hear in what manner he read Greek. He very condescendingly, at my request, took down a Greek Testament, and read, perhaps, twenty verses in one of the gospels, in which the

* Maimon. Hilchot. Mikraot. c. i. § 2. ap. Gill.

word βάπτω occurred. I said, ‘ Sir, you know there is a controversy among Christians respecting the meaning of that word.’ He smiled, and replied, ‘ The Baptists have the advantage of us!’ He cited immediately the well known passage in Pindar, and one or two of those in the Gospels, mentioned in this letter; I inquired, whether, in his opinion, βαπτίζω must be considered equal to βάπτω, which he said was to tinge, as dyers? He replied to this effect; that if there be a difference, he should take the former to be the strongest. He fully assured me, that it signified a *total immersion*. This conversation took place August 27, 1807.” (Baptismal Immersion Defended, pp. 13, 14, &c.)

To this testimony I may subjoin the language of WITSIUS—“ *it cannot be denied*, that the native signification of the word baptise, is to plunge or to dip;”—and of BOSSUET, “ to baptise, signifies to plunge, AS IS GRANTED BY ALL THE WORLD.”

An attempt is made to neutralize the signification of the verb βάπτω in its application to *dyeing*. Our author insists, that *dyeing*, *staining*, and *painting*, were originally similar operations, having been first suggested by the accidental bruising of fruits, or the effects of rain upon earths and minerals. In reply to this, it might be sufficient to say, that in whatever manner the process was primarily discovered, the current meaning of the term which expresses it, involves the idea of immersion, and did so at the very period when the contested words were in colloquial use. *Pliny* states, “ the Egyptians began by *painting* on white

cloths, with certain drugs, which in themselves possessed no colour, but had the property of abstracting or absorbing colouring matters; that these cloths were afterwards *immersed in a heated dyeing liquor*, of an uniform colour, and yet when removed from it soon after, that they were found to be *stained* with indelible colours, differing from one another according to the nature of the drugs which had been previously applied to different parts of the stuff.”* In this passage, we are favoured with an intelligible distinction between *painting*, *immersing* (or the *act* of dyeing) and *staining*; yet we are required to admit, that they were *one*! It will not, however, be deemed rude to inquire, whether, if the premises be admitted, the conclusion is obvious, or whether any point is gained by demanding such a concession? Admit that *staining* and *painting* are the original ideas of the word—is *poptism*, or *pouring* or *sprinkling*, staining or painting; or do they properly represent each other? The inevitable answer to this question suggests the fact—that the disputed term was employed in its current, usual, and recognized application.

There is a passage in PLATO’S Commentaries on Government, in which the repeated application of the term to the art of dyeing, exhibits this subject in the most convincing point of view. “The dyers, when they are about to dip a quantity of wool to make it of a purple colour, cull out the whitest of the fleece, and prepare and work it with a deal of trouble, that it may the better take the grain; and then they dip it, (βάπτουσι.) The

* PLIN. lib. xxxv. cap. 2.

dye of things thus dipped is lasting and unchangeable, and cannot be fetched out or tarnished, either by fair water, or any preparations for discharging colours. But things which are not dyed after this manner, you know what they are; no matter what dye they are dipped in (*βάπτειν*) they never look well; without this preparation they take but a nasty colour, and that is easily washed out too."

The following reference is very triumphantly adduced: "And he was clothed with a vesture *dipped* in blood;"—properly, it is alleged, "a vesture *basattered, sprinkled, spotted, or stained* with blood."—"In this case, evidently, the vesture was not *popped into* the blood, but the blood was *popped upon* the garment, and thus it was *baptized* with blood." It is added, "Some may think the usual translation is defensible, on the supposition that it is a bold hyperbole, and an expression parallel to that in Is. ix. 5, where we read of "garments *rolled in* blood." We should have no objection to the idea of hyperbole, were not the expression "a vesture dipped in blood," unnatural, that is, unlike the thing signified (namely, the blood-stained garb of a conqueror;) which is never the case with the figures of Scripture."

If any thing is *evident* here, it is that Mr. Ewing has mistaken the sense, and unwillingly produced a quotation most unequivocally in our favour. The illustrious personage described is the WORD OF SON OF GOD, under the image of a conqueror seated upon a white horse, *going forth* to a mighty conflict, "*followed* by the armies of heaven." It is not the representation of a conqueror *returned*

from battle, with his garments supposed to be *bespattered* or *stained* with the blood of his vanquished foes; but of one GOING FORTH to the war. A sharp sword issues out of his mouth, “that with it he *should* smite the nations;” ἵνα ἐν αὐτῇ πατάσῃ τὰ ἔθνη. But it may be demanded, is it not incongruous to represent his vesture as stained or bespattered, or dyed in the blood of his enemies before he has engaged in the conflict? The answer is, it does not in reality, though it is so commonly understood, refer to the blood of foes *splashed* in mortal strife upon the garment of the conqueror; it simply contains an emblematical representation of Christ, under the figure of a general, commencing some great expedition, clothed in the splendid vestment which was usual on such occasions. The name given to it by the Roman writers is *paludamentum*. It was the distinguishing robe of the general, and was usually of a purple, or scarlet colour. As the *prætexta*, or white robe, worn by the chief magistrate, constituted the usual domestic badge of honour, so the *paludamentum* distinguished the hero when he marched to battle. “*Quibus erat,*” says Pliny, “*moris paludamento mutare prætextam.*”—“A vesture dyed in blood,” was, therefore, a vesture of a red or purple colour, to express the military character of the expedition; as even to the present day, a peculiar dress, of a vivid and sanguinary hue, is worn by those who are devoted to war. What then becomes of our author’s *bepop-ped* or *besprinkled* vesture? It is found only in his own imagination.

It is alleged, for the twentieth time at least, in

this controversy, that βάπτω is used with reference to Nebuchadnezzar in Dan. iv. 33. "his body was wet (or wetted) with the dew of heaven."—"It was," says Mr. E. "*popped upon*, not even by *effusion*, but by the gentlest *distillation* that is known in nature." To this it has been generally replied, and I think satisfactorily, that a body exposed to eastern dews, would be as wet as if plunged into water: the passage, however, merits a little more detailed explanation. The verb here is used in the passive voice, in the second aorist and the indicative mood, implying consequently that the action was past and indefinite as to time. It does not imply the *manner* in which the effect was produced, but the *effect itself*, not the mode by which the body of the king was wetted, but its *condition*, as resulting from exposure to the dew of heaven. Suppose, by way of illustration, we select another word, and put it into the same voice and tense; as ἐβλάβη ὑπὸ σοῦ "he was hurt by you." It is obvious, that this representation might refer to an injury done long ago, and would predicate nothing of the *manner* in which it was inflicted: it simply expresses the *fact* and the *condition* of injury which resulted. This is the very idiom of all languages, as we say, he was burnt or drowned; the *effect* is simply expressed, without any reference to mode; or if, in either case, it were to be added by fire or by water, it would express no more. The *state* of the body is intended as having been drenched with dew; signifying the condition of being drenched; as being burnt with lightning, or in a conflagration, would mean the

state of being burnt, which resulted from the accident or visitation of fire. It is worthy of consideration also, that the Chaldee word יִצַּק used in the place in question, signifies to dip or dye, and even to sink.

Our author attempts to overthrow the force of *tingo*, as a translation of βάπτω, by stating, “*Tingo* is the Greek τέγγω, which is very properly rendered in the Lexicons, *mafacio, humecto, mollio, I moisten, wet, soften, or mollify.*” This is precisely as though I were to represent in English, that *to wash*, is properly rendered in the Dictionaries, (in *Johnson*, our great lexicographer, to wit) *to moisten, to wet*; and to insist, therefore, that *moistening* a pill with a drop of water, or *wetting lime*, is *washing* it. The reader would object to me, that I had been guilty of concealing the primary sense of the term, and that which essentially enters into its general meaning and current signification, merely to favour some strange hypothesis of my own, and that it was disengenuous in me not to cite the original definition, “*to cleanse by ablution.*” Now, it is very surprising, that Mr. Ewing should have omitted to mention, that βάπτω is *very properly rendered* in the Lexicons, first, *mergo, immergo, tingo, intingo*; that *mergo* is *very properly rendered* in the Lexicons (*Ainsworth*, for instance,) *to put under water*, or any other liquid thing; and that even *tingo* is also *very properly rendered* in the Lexicons, *to dye, colour, or stain.* Our good friend is in eager search of the original import of terms, and he will surely feel obliged to us to recal him from the *secondary* to the *primary* signification.

A sentence is quoted from Herodotus, in which it is stated, that among the Egyptians, if any one should touch a swine, he would go and *plunge himself* into the river, (ἐβαψε ἑωυτόν): but, it is argued, there is one manifest point of difference between this person and the person baptized as a professor of Christianity, for he *performs the operation for himself*. True; but the question is not whether he or another for him, performs the operation, but *what is the meaning of the term?* Does Herodotus state, that the Egyptian, who contracted pollution by touching a swine, *sprinkled, or poured upon, or popped water upon himself?* Our opponent admits, that he intends to describe his *plunging into the river*; and this is all we require to prove the *etymological* point.

The case of Aristobulus, however, the brother of Mariamne, mentioned by Josephus, is a decisive evidence of the use of the term in the sense of one person dipping another. It occurs twice in relating the same story; in the Jewish Antiquities, and in the Wars of the Jews. Aristobulus was *drowned* at the instigation of Herod, by certain Greeks, who enticed him into a pool, where, under pretence of play, βαπτίζοντες, οὐκ ἔννηκαν ἕως καὶ παντάπασιν ἀποπναιξαι, “immersing, (or putting him under water) they did not desist till they had quite suffocated him.”

When it is related that Naaman went and washed seven times in Jordan, the term in question is found in the Septuagint. Mr. Ewing argues, that Elisha bade him *wash*, using the verb λούω, and the historian records, that he baptized,

using the verb βάπτω, *according to the word of Elisha*; hence Naaman *washed* every part of his body, *because the leprosy covered every part*; but “I am persuaded, he did not plunge overhead.” Were the reply to be, “I am persuaded he did,” it would be just as convincing; but the evidence is entirely against my opponent; for if the verbs λούω and βάπτω be here used interchangeably, it proves,—not so much the *manner* of the washing, (of which the other circumstances, going to the river, the nature of the disease, and the constant washing, by bathing, both in warm countries generally, and for religious purposes in particular, are indicative)—but that λούω and βάπτω have a similar signification. The former is the proper word for bathing, from which comes λουτρόν a bath; and however variously the term is applied, like the English word *wash*, it generally implies, *dipping in the water* that which is to be cleansed; this at least is the *generic* import.

It is strenuously contended, that the terms in question relate to “operations on a small scale, and of a gentle nature.” Thus we have the dipping of the priest’s finger, the dipping of a bird, &c. &c. and this “with a single exception.” The *logic* of this, is really incomprehensible. Because, it is a bunch of hyssop, or a priest’s finger, or a little bird, we are to understand *dipping* to mean either *sprinkling* or *pouring*, though the analogy is beyond our powers of discernment. If the hyssop had been as large as the cedar, the finger like a monument, or the bird, a vulture, we might then allow that *dipping* was *dipping*; the very

reasons, if any, which might render the application of the term suspicious. Because, the dipping of the whole body is not on so *small a scale* as the *dipping of the finger*, and because a *bird* is not a *man*, therefore, it is *not dipping*, and however solemnly performed, it is not a *gentle operation* !!!

Numerous examples, however, might be adduced in direct contradiction of the statement, that operations of a gentle nature are commonly implied. The punishment of Clytemnestra, for her parricide, is thus represented in the prediction of Cassandra: "The child, discovering his father's murder, with his own hand shall *thrust* (βάψει) (or, as Scaliger renders it, *merget*, shall *plunge*) his sword into the viper's body" — Εἰς σπλάγχχν' ἐχίδνης αὐτίχειρ βάψει ξίφος. CASSAND. v. 1121.

Again, in Sophocles, "Thou has *thrust* (ἔβαψας) thy sword into the Grecian army" — Ἐβαψας ἔγχος εὖ πρὸς ἀργείων στρατῶ. SOPH. Aj. v. 95.

In Aristophanes, we have "Ἴνα μὴ σε βάψω βαμμα σαοδινιακόν," "lest I dip you into a Sardinian dye." Ἀχαρν. i. 3. The scholiast explains it thus: "If you do not tell me the truth, I will beat you till I make you all red with blood."

In the following passage—ὁ δὲ μόλις ἂ νῦν φέρει φέρων ὑπὸ μικρᾷς ἂν βαπτισθείη προσθήκης (Liban. Epist. 310) "he who bears with difficulty the burden he already has, would be entirely *overwhelmed* (or *crushed*) by a small addition," it will be admitted, that the process is not very *gentle*; and we are very much tempted to suspect, that in this sense

it might be now properly applied to Mr. Ewing's argument.

It has been already intimated, that in the citations respecting the hyssop, the priest's finger, and the bird, whether the scale of operation be small or large, gentle, or sudden and violent, the idea of *dipping* is in every instance conveyed; and no less so by all the classical current uses of the terms in question. Hecuba in Euripedes, calls to her servant, "Go take the water-pot, my good old maid, and dip it (βάψας) in the sea." One of the scholiasts on this passage remarks, and he is surely no insignificant authority in the Greek language, βάπτειν signifies to let down or put any thing into water (ἐστὶ τὸ χαλᾶν τι εἰς ὕδωρ) or any other liquid." Homer in the *Odyssey*, describing the extinction of the eye of Polyphemus, has this simile—"As when a smith to harden a hatchet or massy pole-axe, dips it (βάπτει) in cold water." "If a man dips (βάψει) any thing into wax, as far as it is dipped (ἕως ἔβαψε) it is moved:" Aristotle. He also mentions a pool in Sicily, "into which if birds and other animals are dipped (ἀποβαφῇ) after they are strangled, they instantly recover." And again: "It is the custom of some nations to dip their children (ἀποβάπτειν) into cold water to harden them." Numberless other passages of the same kind might easily be introduced were it at all needful; let these however suffice as specimens of the undoubted use and current acceptance of the contested terms.

Sprinkling does not appear to be regarded by our author with so much favour as *pouring*. It would be needless to follow him here through all his learned quotations: let us merely inquire of him, if pouring be the proper method of administering baptism, what reason can be assigned for the constant use of a term in the New Testament, which every critic admits signifies immersion, and which even Mr. Ewing allows to mean immersion *as much as pouring*; and the entire omission of all those Greek words which contain in their primary, or general application, the sense of effusion or pouring? Either of the following verbs might have answered the purpose; βάλλω *jacio*, ἐκχέω *effundo*, ἐπιχέω *infundo*, ἐκχύνω *effundo*, καταχέω *effundo*, προσχέω *adfuno*; they are moreover all made use of in the writings of the apostles, and yet they are never applied to the ordinance of baptism: the same may be affirmed of ῥαντίζω, *I sprinkle*.

There is another consideration of great importance; the ancient Greek fathers, when writing in their vernacular language, must surely be supposed to understand that language better than a modern critic who has only obtained it from books. To deny this would be to affirm, that a *Otaheitan*, who had never conversed with an Englishman, but who had acquired our vernacular tongue from a grammar and a dictionary, (say, if you please, *Johnson's Dictionary*!) was more likely to understand *English* than Mr. Ewing. It happens that these christian fathers frequently use κατάδυσις as corresponding with βαπτισμός. No one

will dispute that the former term signifies *immersion* at least, for it frequently means not only *plunging down*, but *going to the bottom* and *perishing*.

Ἐν τρισὶ ταῖς καταδύσεσι καὶ ἰσαρίθμοις ταῖς ἐπικλήσεσι τὸ μέγα μυστήριον τῆς βαπτίσματος τελειοῦται, ἵνα καὶ ὁ τῆς θανάτου τυπὸς ἐξεικανισθῇ, καὶ τῇ παραδόσει τῆς θεογνωσίας τὰς ψυχὰς. φωτισθῶσιν οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι. “The great mystery of baptism is accomplished by three *immersions*, and the same number of invocations; and thus the emblem of death is shadowed forth, and those who are baptized, have their souls illuminated by the communication of divine knowledge.” BASIL. M. de Spirit. Sanct. T. II. Cap. 15.

Ὁ βαπτισθεὶς συνθάπτεται τῷ Χριστῷ, διὰ τῶν τριῶν καταδύσεων τὴν τριήμερον τάφην τῆς κυρὸς σχηματίζων, καὶ ἀποθνήσκων ὅσον γε κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν καὶ ἁμαρτητικὸν ἄνθρωπον. “Whoever is *baptized*, is buried with Christ, by three *immersions*, representing the Lord’s burial for three days, and dying, as to the old and sinful man.” THEOPHYLACT. Ad Coloss. Cap. II. v. 12.

Τύπος τῆς θανάτου τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ βάπτισμα· διὰ γὰρ τῶν τριῶν καταδύσεων, τὰς τρεῖς ἡμέρας τῆς τῆς Κυρὸς ταφῆς σημαίνει τὸ βάπτισμα. “Baptism is an emblem of the death of Christ; for by three *immersions*, baptism represents the three days of the Lord’s burial.” DAMASCENUS. Orthod. Fid. lib. 4. cap. 10.

Ἡμῶν, καθάπερ ἐν τινὶ τάφῳ, τῷ ὕδατι καταδύνοντων τὰς κεφαλὰς, ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος θάπτεται καὶ καταδὸς κάτω κρύπτεται ὅλος καθάπαξ. When we *immerse* the head

in water, as in any sepulchre, the old man is *buried*, and the lower parts being *immersed*, the whole person is entirely concealed. CHRYSOSTOM, in Johan. Cap. III.

The Greek fathers universally indeed express themselves in a similar manner; so that, whenever they speak of the manner of performing the rite of baptism, they say it is done ἐν τρισὶ καταδύσεσι “by three *immersions*.”

To fix the signification of the term the more completely, it may be remarked, that καταδύσις and ἀνάδυσις are continually conjoined in the description of the baptismal service; and that I may not be supposed to require the reader to rely upon my unsupported assertions, I shall beg to preface the quotations about to be adduced, with the definitions of Mr. Ewing himself in his Lexicon; “Κατάδυσις, *a going down*.” This word he derives from Καταδύω, which is explained, “*I go down, hide myself, make to go down*.” Again: “Ἀνάδυσις, *an emerging, rising up*, from Ἀναδύω, *I emerge*.” I observe, further, that these words are “*very properly rendered*,” in the same manner, “*in the lexicons*.” Thus prepared, let us study a few passages.

Αἱ τρεῖς καταδύσεις καὶ ἀναδύσεις τῆ βαπτίσματος, θάνατον καὶ ἀνάστασιν σημαίνουσι. “The three *immersions and emersions of baptism*, signify death and resurrection.” PHOTIUS, apud Oecumenium, in Cap. VI. ad Romanos.

Τὸ βάπτισμα ὥσπερ διὰ τῆς καταδύσεως θάνατον, ἔτω διὰ τῆς ἀναδύσεως, τὴν ἀνάστασιν τυποῖ. “Baptism typi-

fies; as by *immersion* death, so by *emersion* resurrection." THEOPHYLACT ad Coloss. Cap. III. v. 1.

Διὰ τῆς ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καταδύσεώς τε καὶ ἀναδύσεως, τριπλῆς τε ἐπικλύσεως, τὴν τριήμερον ταφὴν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν αὐτῆς χριστοῦ ἐξεικονίζομεν. "By *immersion* in water, and *emersion*, even a triple *inundation*, we represent the three days' burial, and the resurrection of Christ himself." GERMANUS Constantinop. in Hist. Eccles. p. 146.

Βαπτιζόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ, μιμούμενοι τὸν θάνατον διὰ τῆς καταδύσεως, καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν διὰ τῆς ἀναδύσεως. "We ourselves also are baptized, imitating the death (of Christ) by *immersion*, and the resurrection by *emersion*." THEOPHYLACT Ep. 1. ad Corinth. Cap. X. v. 2.

Dr. Campbell, speaking of terms which rarely occur in the Greek Testament, remarks;—"This is one of those cases wherein the interpretation given by the earliest Greek fathers deserves particular notice. There are so many advantages which people have for discovering the import of a term or phrase in their mother-tongue, unusual perhaps in writing, but current in conversation, above those who study a dead language solely by the means of books extant in it, that no reasonable person can question that some deference is in such cases due to their authority." *Trans. of Four Gospels, Prelim. Diss. IV. § 8.*

Mr. Ewing introduces the often recited passages from the Greek writers in which the metaphorical sense of being *overwhelmed* with calamity

and *oppressed* with taxes occurs, and which he and his reviewer before referred to, pronounce to be most satisfactory evidence against immersion-baptism. These quotations are given on both sides of the question—the one maintaining that to *overwhelm*, signifies to *pour upon*, the other that it means to *immerse*. Let, however, the ipse dixit of either party be discarded, as obviously impossible to be admitted in evidence. Some of the preceding examples merit, in this point of view, peculiar notice, and cannot fail, I apprehend, of producing a powerful impression upon every dispassionate inquirer. In one of the above recited instances, the term *inundation* is used with reference to the *immersion* and *emersion* of christian baptism. This proves at least the Greek writer's opinion of the meaning of that term in its application to the present subject. The verb he uses is ἐπικλύζω, “very properly rendered in the lexicons,” *inundo, submergo, I inundate, I plunge or dip under water*. The corresponding term καταδύω, perpetually used in the preceding examples, is precisely of similar import, and is translated in the lexicons by the latin verb *demergo*, which is thus anglicized in Ainsworth, *to dive, to flounce, to plunge over head and ears*.

This word is also applied to being *overwhelmed*, or *involved in debt*. The phrase is fully explained in Latin, when Livy speaks of being *Ære alieno demersus*; and which phrase, Ainsworth, who had no thought of controversy in his mind, explains very justly and expressively by the English idiom, *over head and ears in debt*.

To Mr. E.'s and the pædobaptist translation in general of the Greek quotations, in which βαπτίζω occurs in the sense of *oppressing* or *overwhelming*, I have no objection; but instead of aiding, it subverts their cause. Does the word *oppress* or *overwhelm* signify to *pour upon* or *sprinkle*? Let us inquire of the authority so much relied upon by Mr. Ewing—

To OPPRESS, v. a. (oppressus, lat.) to *crush by hardship* or *unreasonable severity*: to *overpower*, to *subdue*. Is this at all analogous to *sprinkling* or *pouring*?

To OVERWHELM, v. a. (*over* and *whelm*) to *crush underneath something violent and weighty*. Is this represented by *sprinkling* or *pouring*?

The sensible remarks of ROBINSON will form an appropriate conclusion to this part of our subject.* “Whether John the Baptist and the Apostles of our blessed Lord baptized by pouring on water, or by bathing in water, is to be determined chiefly, though not wholly, by ascertaining the precise meaning of the word baptize. A linguist determines himself by his own knowledge of the Greek language, and an illiterate man by the best evidence he can obtain from the testimony of others. To the latter it is sufficient to observe, that the word is confessedly Greek; that native Greeks must understand their own language better than foreigners, and that they have always understood the word baptism to signify dipping; and therefore, *from their first em-*

* Hist. of Baptism, p. 5.

bracing of Christianity to this day they have always baptized by immersion. This is an authority for the meaning of the word baptize, infinitely preferable to that of European lexicographers; so that a man who is obliged to trust human testimony, and who baptizes by immersion because the Greeks do, understands a Greek word exactly as the Greeks themselves understand it; and in this case the Greeks are unexceptionable guides, and their practice is, in this instance, safe ground of action."

ON THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BAPTISM AND BURIAL.

THE validity of an argument founded upon a metaphorical allusion, must depend entirely upon the manner in which it is conducted, and its general coincidence with conclusions deducible from other sources. Its independent merit may be comparatively small, when it ought, however, by no means to be overlooked. If the evidence adduced in support of our system rested entirely upon a figure of speech, it might be reasonable and just to regard it with some feelings of suspicion; because from the very nature of baptism as an institution of the christian church, a positive, plain, authoritative precept or example, would seem to be requisite to enforce its observance: such a precept or example being proved, however, to exist, a figurative allusion may be taken as corroborative of our interpretation of its import. Although it might be contended on the one hand, that a metaphor afforded but a flimsy foundation of argument, where a definite and positive law was essential; yet on the other, it must be considered, that as every metaphor or simile has some *truth* upon which it is constructed, that

primary idea or fact must be invariably regarded. There is in every case such an original idea, and it is *in* that idea the two subjects of comparison meet, and from some acknowledged correspondence with them both, the propriety of the figure is evinced. Hence in reasoning upon a metaphor, we may in reality be reasoning upon *a simple truth*, which is its basis, and is consequently capable of sustaining our statements.

This is precisely our situation with reference to the 4th and 5th verses of the sixth chapter of Romans, and the 12th verse of the second chapter of Colossians. Were there no clear enunciation of the law of baptism in Scripture, and no sufficient evidence of the original mode of its administration, it is questionable how far we ought to rely solely upon a single metaphorical expression, unless we could absolutely determine its primary meaning, by divesting it of its decorations. Still, in the present case, we are not reduced to the necessity of proceeding upon such a principle. Our author and every pœdobaptist admits that *some correspondence* is intended to be expressed between baptism and burial, by the allusion contained in the above cited passages. The question is not *whether any*, but *what* correspondence subsists, or is intended to be asserted or implied? Is it such a correspondence as tends to substantiate the baptist argument, or is it only such as admits of the pœdobaptist interpretation and practice? This is the great subject of consideration.

I shall not offer any comment on the extraordinary opinion that “the *only* original reason why

baptism has been thought to imply immersion, is the expression which occurs in Rom. vi. 4. and Col. ii. 12.”—because this is so *original* an idea, (we believe peculiar to our author) and proposes so summary and gratuitous a method of disposing of all the *Greek terms*, all the *public circumstances* belonging to the institution, and all the *pre-requisites* of repentance and faith in the mind of the instructed disciple of the Saviour, that we shall at once leave it, adorned with the “blushing honours” of self-refutation.

The argument for immersion deduced from the metaphorical allusions in Romans and Colossians, Mr. Ewing endeavours to evade in two ways;—*first*, by considering the reference to be *not to the act of interment*, but to the *preparatory rites*;—*secondly*, by attempting to shew that, *even in the act of interment*, the ancient mode was so dissimilar to the present, that it fails to sustain the required inference that to baptize is to plunge, dip, or overwhelm. Although he has not stated the question in this logical form, these are in reality his arguments, and under these two general divisions, I shall, for the sake of perspicuity, arrange my observations.

I. CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE PREPARATORY RITES.

Our author remarks that, “to bury,” not only includes all the preparations of the body for interment, but is used in cases where our method of interment was not practised, where no interment followed at the time, and where no final

interment followed at all." In the Hebrew וַיִּהְיוּ, "they embalmed him," is, in the Septuagint, ἔθαψαν, "they buried him." The instance is afterwards cited of the woman who poured ointment on our Saviour's head, of whom he said—"In that she hath poured this ointment on my body she did it for my burial."

The remark that the Septuagint adopts the verb θάπτω, to express the act of *embalming* Joseph, has no bearing upon the subject; for as it is immediately added, (Gen. l. 26.) "he was put in a coffin in Egypt," it is obvious, that the LXX have rather *interpreted* than translated the Hebrew word. Besides, not only would the authority of the Septuagint as the basis of etymological argument be notoriously inadequate, we need not advance beyond the very chapter wherein the term is taken to prove the frequent inaccuracy of that version. Compare, for instance, the *second* and the *twenty-sixth* verses. In the former the words are—וַיִּצַו יוֹסֵף אֶת־עֲבָדָיו אֶת־הָרָפָאִים—וַיִּהְיוּ וַיִּהְיוּ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיִּהְיוּ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיִּהְיוּ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל—which, in the Septuagint, are rendered, Καὶ προσέταξεν Ἰωσήφ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐνταφιασταῖς ἐνταφιάσαι τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνταφίασαν οἱ ἐνταφιασταὶ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ. In the latter verse (26th), the expression is וַיִּהְיוּ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל, translated in the Septuagint καὶ ἔθαψαν αὐτὸν. Here it is observable in the first passage, that the Septuagint translators have omitted the term *servants*, and have rendered the *two different* Hebrew words for physicians and for the act of embalming, by the *same* Greek term, and that twice over: in the second passage, they have given quite a *different* word, as

the translation of the *very same* Hebrew verb. The English translation of the Septuagint would be—"And Joseph commanded all his *embalmers* to *embalm* his father; and the *embalmers embalmed* Israel," ver. 2. "And they *buried* him," ver. 26,—whereas the real and literal rendering of the Hebrew is—"And Joseph commanded his servants, the *physicians*, to EMBALM his father; and the *physicians EMBALMED* Israel,"—"and they EMBALMED him."

"It is our happiness," says Mr. Ewing, "to know that our blessed Saviour never was finally interred." Whence the peculiar satisfaction of such a discovery can arise, I am really at a loss to imagine; especially as this remark is followed by the immediate citation of the words "he was buried, and he rose again the third day." In Acts xiii. 29, 30. it is recorded, "they took him down from the tree and *laid him in a sepulchre*; but God raised him from the dead;" and yet we are instructed to deduce peculiar consolation from the thought, that "he was never *finally* interred!" Surely he was either interred or not—he was either laid in a sepulchre or not. Does Mr. E. intend to say he was not interred because he did not see *corruption*? or that he was not *finally* interred, because he did not remain in the sepulchre during a longer period than three days?—or because his female friends had not time to finish the entire process of embalming him? Whether *finally* interred or not, was he REALLY interred? If Mr. E. intends to insinuate the negative (which he seems to do by representing

that our Lord was not interred, but only *prepared* to be buried), we must charge it upon him as a serious contradiction to Scripture testimony, and as tending to subvert one of the most important facts of Christianity, upon which our faith reposes; if he admit the affirmative, then his reasoning is ruined; he has virtually said nothing. Either horn of this dilemma will inevitably pierce his argument.

Besides, so far as the notion of the interment not being *final*, can be supposed to have any foundation in fact, and any force in argument, it is altogether in our favour. "Our blessed Saviour was never *finally* interred;" the Baptists do not *finally immerse*, that is, they do not *drown* their candidates, but represent a spiritual burial with Christ, and a resurrection to newness of life, by a temporary, not a *final* submersion under water.

But why, it may naturally be inquired, does Mr. Ewing resort to so singular a subterfuge? It is to answer a particular purpose, as we shall immediately perceive; and we shall perceive also that the purpose is by no means answered. He would persuade the reader, that "being *buried* with Christ in baptism," refers to the *preparation for burying*; especially to the *washing* performed on the occasion. We are to understand, therefore, that the *washing*, as a part of the preparation for interment, signifies *burial*; and that this is the particular idea in the phrase "as the manner of the Jews is to bury:" for, says our Author, "except this washing, and the anointing which followed it, I can see no point of resemblance be-

tween the burial of Christ and our baptism at all," p. 99. Now, *in the first place*, it would be putting Mr. Ewing upon a most perplexing search, to require him to produce any passage in Hebrew or Greek antiquity, wherein *washing* means *burying*: or wherein, consequently *νύτρη*, the *washing vessel* signifies the *burying vessel*. If we allow the latitude of signification for which he would plead, with reference to the verbs *θάπτω*, *ἐνταφιάζω*, and *ἐνταφιασμός*, it will by no means sustain his statement; for the expression *καθὼς ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς Ἰσδαίοις ἐνταφιάζειν*, "as the manner of the Jews is to bury," refers (*ipso judice*) to the *whole process of embalming*, "as far as in this instance it went," to use his own phraseology. How far then did it go?—"And when Joseph had taken the body, he wrapped it in a clean linen cloth," Mat. xxvii. 59. "And there came also Nicodemus (which at the first came to Jesus by night) and brought a mixture of myrrh and aloes, about an hundred pound weight. Then took they the body of Jesus, and wound it in linen clothes with the spices, *as the manner of the Jews is to bury*," John xix. 39. According to Mr. Ewing's reasoning, the latter expression ought to be interpreted to mean only the *preparation for the burial*; whereas it obviously signifies, "that this mode of proceeding is usual with the Jews *at the time of their burying their dead, or when they bury their dead*." Here both in Greek and English we should understand, not that the *preparations* were the *burial*, but that they were attended to as usual *on that occasion*.

"Preparations of his body for his burial were

made, both by anticipation, and after the event of his death had taken place. In *both cases* they are called ‘his burial,’” p. 96. It should have been “*in neither case.*” We have already explained the signification of the phrase “as the manner of the Jews is to bury;” the other passage shall be given with the interpretation of an eminent pædobaptist, Dr. Doddridge:—“John xii. 1—7, Matthew xiv. 8, and xxvi. 12. And indeed my departure out of the world is so near, that with respect to this action of our friend Mary, which you are ready to condemn, I must say, that *she has reserved this ointment for the day of my burial*; and not knowing whether she may have an opportunity of assisting in those last offices, *she has now done what she could; for in that she has poured out this ointment on my body, she has in a manner come before the time thus to anoint and to embalm my body for the burial.*”—Family Expositor. Preserve also in recollection the phrase already cited, “they laid him in a sepulchre;” and then enquire with what possible reason it can be contended that the *preparations* are denominated the *burial*? It is to the *preparations* exclusively—the *embalming*—the allusion is made,—εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν τοῦ ἐνταφιασμοῦ μου τετηρηκεν αὐτό. The term used, it will be observed, is ἐνταφιασμος: for the meaning of which, and of the verb whence it is derived, we have only to apply to Mr. Ewing’s own Lexicon,—“Ἐνταφιάζω, *I prepare a corpse for burial*, as by washing, anointing, swathing, &c. *I embalm.* Ἐνταφιασμος, *a preparation of a corpse for burial*, as by anointing, &c.

embalming. Is the *preparation* for a solemnity the *performance*? Do *washing*, *anointing*, and the other last offices of kindness constitute the *burying*? Does our Lord say of Mary that she *buried* him? Does he not rather say she hath *anointed* me FOR (in *preparation for*, by *anticipation of*) my burial?—Herodotus also expressly distinguishes the preparatory rites, or the embalming, from the burial or interment—“Ὅς δὲ ἂν ἢ αὐτῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἢ ξείνων ὁμοίως ὑπὸ κροκοδείλου ἀρπαχθεῖς, ἢ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ φαίνεται τεθνηῶς, κατ’ ἣν ἂν πόλιν ἐξενειχθῇ, τούτους πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ ταριχεύσαντας αὐτὸν, καὶ περιστείλαντας ὡς κάλλιστα, θάψαι ἐν ἱερῇσι θήκησι· οὐδὲ ψαῦσαι ἔξεστι αὐτοῦ ἄλλον οὐδένα, οὔτε τῶν προσηκόντων, οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλὰ μιν οἱ ἱερεῖς αὐτοῖς οἱ τοῦ Νείλου, ἅτε πλέον τι ἢ ἀνθρώπου νεκρὸν, χειραπτάζοντες θάπτουσι. “If any Egyptian or stranger be found either destroyed by a crocodile, or drowned in the river, the city nearest which he is discovered, is compelled to *embalm* the body, and shew every possible attention, and to *bury* it in some sacred place: no one is suffered on any account to touch; neither friend nor relative; but only the priests of the Nile, who *bury* the dead body with extraordinary respect.” HEROD. Euterpe, xc.

Surely, after these considerations, it is rather too much to require us to believe, that “what is said in Scripture of Christ’s burial, can have no reference to interment, but must refer exclusively to preparatory rites.” p. 101. Surprising! Christ was *laid in a sepulchre*, but was not buried; for to be buried is to be *anointed* and *washed*; to be

laid in the sepulchre, means then, *not* to be laid in a sepulchre—it signifies, to *be rolled in linen with spices!* If the subject were not so serious, we should be really tempted to exclaim, “*Risum teneatis, amici?*”—but no dispassionate inquirer can come to any other conclusion than that a favourite hypothesis, adopted merely for the purpose of supporting a system, has warped the better judgment of our respectable opponent.

But, *in the second place*, so far from *washing* being the principal act, and from which the entire reference to burial is taken, it is *not mentioned at all*;—in the account of funeral preparations *anciently it is also very frequently omitted*; and it might even be plausibly maintained, that *in the present instance it was not practised*. These considerations are all so point blank against our author, that they merit a distinct, but very brief illustration.

1. *Washing is not named*. A simple inspection of the history is itself a sufficient proof; and Mr. Ewing being aware of it, and somewhat conscious of the necessary inference, *slips in by a sort of accident*, incidentally, which the reader will, perhaps, have the kindness to allow, for his sake, to *slip out of his recollection*, that “although the washing is not specified, it must be *supposed to have taken place* previously to the wrapping of the body in the fine and clean linen cloth with the spices.” p. 99. It is surely remarkable, that the washing, to which, in our author’s opinion, the allusion in the 6th of Romans is made, instead of being introduced as the *chief circumstance*, was merely inci-

dental, at the utmost probably practised, but not even named.

2. *In ancient accounts of funeral preparations, it is so comparatively unimportant, or it is to be considered as so little a part of the ceremony of embalming or burying, as frequently to be unnoticed when they are described.* In the history of Jacob's departure, it is said, "they embalmed him, and he was put in a coffin in Egypt." In the Septuagint, it is, as Mr. E. remarks, *ἐθαψαν*, "they buried him." But if washing had been so important a part of the ceremonial, one might have expected the inspired writer to say, they *washed him*, and put him in a coffin. (Gen. l. 26.) Of Asa, it is recorded, "they buried him in his own sepulchre, and laid him on the bed which was filled with sweet odours and divers kinds of spices, prepared by the apothecaries' art." (2 Chron. xvi. 14.) We read among the Jews, of the *spices of the dead*; "they don't say a blessing over a lamp, nor over the spices of idolaters; nor over a lamp, nor over *הבשמים של מהיב*, the *spices of the dead*." Misn. Beracot, c. 8. § 6. R. Jonathan alludes to another part of the preparatory customs thus *יכרך המת בכריני*, *let the dead be wrapt in his own linen*.—T. Hieros. Terumot, fol. 46, 2.

I am not contending, that the dead body was not in general washed; but that this was an inconsiderable and incidental part of the preparations for interment, not such as to constitute a point of allusion as to a chief and important ceremonial. The reference, in a case of allusion, where the part was to be taken for the whole, would surely be to

some one of the principal circumstances, as to the swathing of the body in linen, or the use of spices for its preservation, or the final act of interment, and not to that which is evidently and wholly incidental. There is no conceivable reason why the washing only should be represented as the burial, and allusively as the baptism, or of the nature of the baptism of the Christian dispensation.

3. It seems probable, that in the case of our Lord's sepulture, the *washing was really omitted*. The whole ceremony was performed with as much rapidity as comported with respect: the Sabbath was approaching; and they had only time to deposit the body hastily in the sepulchre, after that imperfect embalming which was practised at the moment, to do him honour, but which was to have been completed at, what Mr. E. calls, the *final* interment. It is plain, they would not be particular about cleansing the body in the usual way; but *as far as the record informs us*, (and we are not warranted to invent history where Scripture is silent) they simply and with the utmost expedition wrapped the body in linen with spices.

In the third place, had the term βάπτω or βαπτίζω been employed in the descriptions given by HERODOTUS and DIODORUS SICULUS, of the preparatory rites of burial, it might have invested the professed discovery of the genuine application of the word in question with some degree of plausibility; and though *we* should not choose to resort to such a plea, in support of a palpable innovation, the eagerness with which our pædobaptist friends

seize upon the most trifling circumstance, and press into their service the most recondite and remote signification, which can at any time, or in any instance, be found to have attached to any phrase or monosyllable, superinduces the conviction, that their learned advocate would have been much gratified, if either of the ancient historians had been so accommodating as to adopt these terms. It is not βάπτω, however, but λούω they have seen fit to use; we cannot help it—but so it is: but, in spite of the wishes of modern critics and theorists, HERODOTUS writes, that “after seventy days are expired λούσαντες τὸν νεκρὸν κατειλίσσουσι πᾶν αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα συνδόνοϛ βυσσίνης” “having *washed* the dead person, they roll up his whole body in fine linen.” *Euterpe*. DIODORUS also is firm to the verb λούω—“Lastly, having *washed* the body, they anoint it with oil of cedar and other things, for about thirty days.” Biblioth. lib. 1.

HOMER also, in referring to Patroclus, employs the same verb—

Καὶ τότε δὴ λούσαντο, καὶ ἤλειψαν λίπ' ελαίῳ.
IL. ó. v. 350.

As soon as *washed*, they anointed him with oil.

Sometimes the bones of the dead were washed with wine; but, unhappily, even in this case, the Greek writers adhere to λούω or ἀλείφω, to *wash* or to *anoint*, and will not favour us, upon any consideration, with βάπτω. Thus, in the *Odyssey*, Agamemnon informs Achilles of the performance of this ceremony upon him—

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ σε φλόξ ἥνυσεν Ηφαίστιο
 Ἡῶθεν δὴ τοι λέγομεν λευκ' ὅτ' ἔ'Αχιλλεῦ,
 Οἶνω ἐν ἀκρότηϊ κ' ἐν ἀλείφατι.—

ODYSS. ω. v. 71.

But when the flame your body had consum'd,
 With oils and odours we your bones perfum'd,
 And wash'd with unmix'd wine.—

There is another consideration, to which, with our friend's permission, it may be proper to advert. The Greek language is remarkably copious, and it would have been both natural and easy for the inspired writer to have selected many other terms for the purpose of expressing either *washing* or *embalming*, in the allusive passages in Romans and Colossians; for example, λούω, to *wash*, or ἐνταφιάζω, to *embalm*: instead of which, he says, in the former epistle, Συνετάφημεν αὐτῷ, and in the latter, Συνταφέντες αὐτῷ, making use, in both cases, of the verb θάπτω, to *bury*, in the genuine and legitimate sense of interring, committing to the earth, or “laying in a sepulchre.”

As a further elucidation of the subject, let us simply consider the words “buried with him;” when the construction and the signification will remain uninfluenced by the omission of the concluding part of the sentence. Suppose we had found the phrase alone; whether it were to be understood *literally* or *metaphorically*, is indifferent to the argument. How, then, according to our author, must the expression be interpreted? Thus:—“To *bury*, does not mean to *inter*, to put in the ground; it only means to *anoint*, to *wash*, or *sprinkle the body with spices*, or to *roll it up in linen*.

To be *buried*, therefore, is to be *anointed*, or *washed*, or *sprinkled with spices*, or *wrapped up in linen*." Common sense would reply, and so would sound criticism :—" Though these are all *preparatory rites*, and such as were usual with the ancients, yet the historian does not *say*, that he was *anointed*, or *washed*, or *sprinkled*, or *rolled in linen*, but that he was *buried*, or *entombed* !" And might not common sense and sound criticism concur also in this question—Had the writer said, *anointed with him*, or *washed as he was washed*, what should we have thought of the following interpretation—" To *anoint*, or to *wash*, means to *put into the ground*, or into a cavern ; consequently, "*anointed with him*," does not refer to *any* of the *preparatory rites* of sepulture, but to the *act of interment—to burial* ?" Surely, if we were allowed thus to play upon terms, and divert from their legitimate and most obvious signification, the plainest historical records of inspiration, we might, indeed, acquire the reputation of being ingenious sophists, but not faithful and sound divines.

II. CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INTERMENT ITSELF.

If Mr. E. had proved his point, that the allusion in the viith of Romans was to the preparatory washing in the funeral solemnities, it would seem to be a work of supererogation to attempt a new interpretation of the recorded fact of our Saviour's sepulchral interment ; but, being somewhat perplexed upon adverting to the illustration contained in the xiith of Matthew, and the direct statement

in the xiiith of Acts, he summons all his ingenuity again into the field. "For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." (Matt. xii. 40.) Again—"They took him down from the tree, and laid him in a sepulchre. But God raised him from the dead." (Acts xiii. 29, 30.)

It is alleged, "his body was not lowered into a grave, and covered with earth. It was not laid under ground, but carried into a tomb hewn out of a rock.—The entrance to it was not the mouth of a pit, but is called "the door,"—like the door of a parlour, that is, of an apartment on the first floor.—It (the body) was never finally deposited in the tomb—but was carried into the tomb, and left in it for security.—It was not interred within the tomb, for the women who saw how the body was laid, thought of no obstacle to the getting access to it, except the stone at the door, which must be rolled away.—The body of Christ was not lowered, and rose up, but was carried in and came forth; and what is said in Scripture of his final burial, can have no reference to final interment, but exclusively to preparatory rites." p. 100, 101. It had been previously stated, "that among the Jews, the sepulchres appear, from an early period to have been valued in proportion as they were elevated above the surface.—The hills and the rocks were the chosen situations, and the buildings were not constructed in subterraneous excavations, but reared as conspicuous and ornamental

superstructures, for the reception of the dead.”
p. 95.

It is not easy to imagine a series of assertions more calculated to mislead, although a little close attention will be sufficient to detect their sophism, and expose their fallacy. In order, however, to do this the more effectually, and with a view especially to our illustration of the phraseology in question, “buried with him by baptism,” it will be requisite to ascertain the prevalent idea of the ancients when they discoursed on the subject of burying, and the usual mode, and particular places of performing this ceremony.

1. *With regard to the GENERAL and most PREVALENT IDEA among the ancients, when discoursing on the subject of burial, or interment.*—The opinion of Cicero will surely be admitted to merit some attention, and he represents *interment* as the most natural, and the most ancient mode of burial. *At mihi quidem antiquissimum sepulturæ genus id fuisse videtur quo apud Xenophontem Cyrus utitur. Redditur enim terræ corpus, et ita locatum ac situm, quasi operimento matris obducitur.** “The most ancient kind of burial appears to have been that which, according to Xenophon, was used by Cyrus. For the body is *restored to the earth*, and so placed as to be *covered with its mother’s veil*.” Speaking of the Trausi, as being uniform in their manners with the rest of the Thracians, excepting in what relates to the birth of their children, and the

* De Leg. ii. 22.

burial of their dead, Herodotus observes with reference to the latter, τὸν δὲ ἀπογενόμενον, παίζοντές τε καὶ ἡδόμενοι γῇ κρύπτουσι, ἐπιλέγοντες ὕσων. κακῶν ἕξαπαλλαχθεῖς, ἔστι ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίῃ. “When any one dies, the body is *committed to the ground*, (or *hid in the earth*,) with clamorous joy: for the deceased, they say, delivered from his miseries, is then supremely happy.” He further speaks of nations, where the practice is for a wife to be “sacrificed by her nearest relation *on the tomb* of her husband, and afterwards *buried with him*.” σφάζεται ἐς τὸν τάφον ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκηϊωτάτου ἐωυτῆς· σφαχθεῖσα δὲ, συνθάπτεται τῷ ἀνδρί.—HEROD. Terp. iv. v,

The custom of raising tumuli or barrows over the dead was universal in times of the remotest antiquity; of which HOMER, XENOPHON, VIRGIL, in fact all the principal Greek and Roman authors furnish ample evidence. It prevailed also among the Germans, and other uncivilized nations. But such a practice is sufficiently indicative of the original and most prominent idea of burial that prevailed in remote antiquity; namely, that of *committing to the earth*, and *covering with earth*. Diodorus Siculus and Herodotus, after detailing the whole process of embalming, describe the deposition of the dead in coffins, and placing them in the ground, as the subsequent and final operations, to the latter of which *the distinctive term* is exclusively applied. Comp. DIOD. SIC. Biblioth. lib. i. cap. 91—93. HEROD. Euterpe.

All the ancient nations cherished extreme horror at the thought of being uninterred, with reference to which the *original idea* is most clearly marked.

When Ulysses visited the infernal regions, he thus expresses himself:

“There wandering through the gloom I first survey’d,
New to the realms of death, Elpenor’s shade;
His cold remains, all *naked to the sky*,
On distant shores, unwept, *unburied* lie.”

The ghost urgently implores the rites of sepulture,

“The tribute of a tear is all I crave,
And the possession of a *peaceful grave*.”

The Greeks and Romans entertained the firmest conviction that their souls would not be admitted into the Elysian fields till their bodies were buried, or committed to the earth; and if this were not the case, they were supposed to wander about for a hundred years, in a state of exclusion from the mansions of the blest. Travellers, therefore, who happened to find a dead body, cast dirt upon it three times, and whoever neglected to do so drew a curse upon himself, which no sacrifice could remove. Horace makes the shade of Archytas solicit this service of a passing seaman; and urges that it would not occasion any great delay whatever might be his haste:

“At tu, nauta, vagæ ne parce malignus arenæ,
Ossibus et capiti inhumato
Particulam dare.

Quamquam festinas, non est mora longa; licebit
Injecto ter pulvere curras.”

Carm. i. 28.

Similar considerations are deducible from the scriptural account of the burial places of the ancients. On the death of Sarah, Abraham entreated the sons of Heth to give him possession of a burying-place, and he purchased of Ephron the son of Zohar, the field of Machpelah and the *cave therein*, which was in the *end of the field*, Gen. xxiii. 3—20. David expresses great satisfaction when informed, “that the men of Jabesh-Gilead were they that *buried* Saul,” having rescued their Sovereign’s remains from the enemies’ walls, and committed them to the family sepulchre,—2 Sam. ii. 4.

It is surely needless to accumulate further evidence that the ancient writers, both profane and sacred, when recording or referring to the funeral service, intended by *burial* the *actual committal of the body to the earth*—that this was the *primary*, and has ever been the *predominant* and *characteristic* notion of *burying*.

2. We have next to *examine the* USUAL MODE, *and the* PARTICULAR PLACES *appropriated to the burying of the dead*. “You are to form to yourself,” says Lowth, “an idea of an immense subterraneous vault (in cases of splendid interment), a vast gloomy cavern, all around the sides of which are cells to receive the dead bodies.” The most ancient modes and places of burial, appear to have been in fields, gardens, caves and mountains. Calmet mentions that Ezekiel intimates graves were dug under the mountain upon which the temple stood; since God says, that in future his holy mountain should not be polluted with the

dead bodies of their kings. Moses, Aaron, Eleazar and Joshua were buried in mountains; Saul and Deborah under the shade of trees; Sarah in a cave. Mr. Ewing's own account of the proceeding with regard to our Saviour is correct; he was carried into the new tomb of Joseph in the *side* of the mount, or solid rock—in the *side* of which a tomb was “hewed out.” The sepulchres of distinguished individuals were frequently in very elevated situations; not in valleys, but in the sides of hills, the entrance by a door.

The tombs at Napolese, the ancient Sichem, where Joseph, Joshua and others were buried, are hewn out of the solid rock, and are durable as the hills in which they are excavated; constituting integral parts of mountains, and chiselled with inconceivable labour. The tombs of Telmissus described by Dr. Clarke are of two kinds; the one the true Grecian *soros*, and the Roman *sarcophagus*; the other, “sepulchres hewn *in the face* of perpendicular rocks.” One quotation from this celebrated traveller with regard to Jerusalem will suffice:—“Having quitted the city by what is called ‘Sion gate,’ we descended into a dingle or trench, called Tophet or Gehinnon, by Sandys. As we reached the bottom of this narrow dale, sloping towards the valley of Jehosaphat, we observed upon the sides of the opposite mountain, facing Mount Sion, a number of excavations in the rock, similar to those already described among the ruins of Telmissus. We rode towards them. When we arrived, we instantly recognized the sort of *sepulchres* which had so much interested us in

Asia Minor. . . . They were all of the same kind of workmanship, exhibiting a *series of subterraneous chambers*. The doors were so low, that to look into any one of them it was necessary to stoop, and in some instances to creep upon our hands and knees: these doors were also *grooved* for the reception of immense *stones*, once squared and fitted to the grooves, by way of closing the entrances. Of such a nature were indisputably the tombs of the sons of Heth, of the kings of Israel, of Lazarus, and of Christ.”*

It appears then that ancient sepulchres, and those especially in the vicinity of Jerusalem, were *excavations in the sides of rocks or mountains*, corresponding with what we usually term *caves*, or *cells*, or “*gloomy caverns* ;” and consequently to be *laid in a sepulchre*, was to be deposited in one of these receptacles of the dead ; that is, to be placed in one of these hollows, cut in the side of the solid rock, some at one elevation, some at another, all *below the summit*, and of course far underground, or in a subterraneous situation. Whether a body therefore were lowered down perpendicularly, or put in horizontally, it was, in being buried, *introduced into a subterraneous vault*.

As our author has so triumphantly quoted Johnson on the word *Pop*, it may be proper here to introduce an explanation of the word *sepulchre* from the same distinguished lexicographer ; after which the words “*laid in a sepulchre*” may be fairly left to be their own interpreters.

* Travels, p. ii. vol. 4.

SEPULCHRE, *n. s.* [*sepulcre*, Fr. *sepulchrum*, Lat.]
A grave; a tomb.

To entail him and 's heirs unto the crown,
What is it but to make thy *sepulchre*?

Shakspeare's Henry VI.

Flies and spiders get a *sepulchre* in amber, more durable
than the monument and embalming of any king. *Bacon.*

There, where the virgin's son his doctrine taught,
His miracles, and our redemption, wrought;

Where I, by thee inspir'd, his praises sung,
And on his *sepulchre* my offering hung. *Sandys.*

Perpetual lamps, for many hundred years, have continued
burning, without supply, in the *sepulchres* of the ancients.

Wilkins.

If not one common *sepulchre* contains
Our bodies, or one urn our last remains,
Yet Cyrex and Alcyone shall join.

Dryden.

We have now ascertained two points—the first, that the universal notion connected with *burying* from the remotest antiquity, was that of *committing to the earth*; and that the particular mode of doing so, in cases where honourable interment especially, was intended, was that of *putting the body into a subterraneous vault*.

Let us now turn to the statement of Mr. Ewing—
“His body was not lowered—not covered with earth—not laid underground,” yet, he adds, “it was carried into a tomb hewn out of the rock.” How it could be carried into a *subterraneous vault*, and not carried or laid *underground*; or how it could be *covered with a mountain*, or with a considerable part of it, and not *covered with earth*, is rather difficult to imagine! An ancient *sepulchre*

is considered to resemble a first apartment in a house, the door was like the common entrance to a parlour; and what follows? A building erected on the surface is precisely similar to a cave excavated far below it! Passing this discrepancy, our author's ingenuity can never avert the conclusion from his own premises, that the parlour is *under the roof*, and not *above it*! In this point indeed it may possibly be said to resemble a subterraneous excavation.

It is stated, that "when they entered the sepulchre, and went out of it," it is not said that they went down, and came up, but that "they went in," and "came out." This criticism on the words εἰσελθοῦσαι—ἐξελθοῦσαι, εἰσῆλθεν—απῆλθον, is singularly futile, for a person of our opponent's acknowledged learning. Whether they went *down* or *up*, or *longitudinally* or *transversely*, upon entering the sepulchre, in no way affects the question whether *the sepulchre itself* were *subterraneous* or *superficial* in its position; and the terms employed, simply express their *entrance* and *exit*.

Having thus followed Mr. Ewing through all the tortuosities of his course, and candidly, we trust, examined all his statements, it is time to close the present section. If we do not greatly err, our impartial readers will admit that his argument is defunct; and so far as respects its future resuscitation in the baptismal controversy, we recommend that it be *finally buried*!

DEFENCE OF DR. CAMPBELL.

THE reputation of Dr. Campbell as a biblical critic we have been hitherto accustomed to consider as unquestionably established; and without reckoning him as infallible, all parties avail themselves of his opinion. It was, therefore, with no inconsiderable surprize, that we found Mr. Ewing first impugning his authority, and his "literary Christian friend" afterwards displacing him from the situation of the first class of Scripture critics. He is, says the latter, "abundantly opiniative," and "as a critic and philologist, often exceptionable;" the former charges him with vanity, dogmatism, and inconsistency, if not insincerity in his religious profession.

This twofold attack upon his critical acuteness and his moral character, originates entirely in his having ventured to record his sentiments upon the unwelcome subject of baptism, (in which he agrees with multitudes of his pædobaptist brethren, in and out of the establishment, in maintaining the true primitive meaning of the term baptize) and in his presuming to give a translation of a particular passage, which militates against the system of our author and his friend. This

is “the head and front of his offending;” and if the Doctor were indefensible in his statements, we should willingly leave him to his fate, without considering our general views in the slightest essential degree affected: truth, however, as well as candour, require some further examination into the merits of the case.

The contested passages are the sixth and eleventh verses of the third chapter of Matthew. In the former it is stated, according to the common translation, that the people were baptized of John *in Jordan*; and in the latter he affirms of himself, “I baptize you *with* water,” and predicts of Jesus “he shall baptize you *with the Holy Ghost and with fire*.” Dr. Campbell remarks upon the disagreement of these different renderings with the original text, in which the phraseology is in every instance the same. He charges it upon the translators in general as an inconsistency, that in the 6th verse they should have rendered ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ, “*in Jordan*,” and ἐν ὕδατι, in the 11th verse “*with water*.” Passing over the remarks on the Popish and Protestant translators which might be variously explained, let us examine Mr. Ewing’s criticisms and objections.

He begins by asserting that the translation was different in these two verses, because there was a difference of the connection in which they occur; “in verse 11, the writer speaks of the *act* and the *elements* of baptism—in verse 6, he speaks of the *place*, where the Baptist was performing the act;” and that *in Jordan* means “*in the plain of Jordan, in the valley of Jordan, or in Jordan-dale*.”

This is all very ingenious; but unfortunately for the pædobaptist argument, it is by no means substantial or tenable. In the first place, it will furnish no inconsiderable evidence of the fallacy of this representation if we read the 5th and 6th verses, which compose the whole sentence, in their connection, and observe how the criticism will apply to the narrative.—“There went out to him Jerusalem and all Judea, and *all the region round about Jordan*; and were baptized of him *in the plain of Jordan*, confessing their sins.” The words are *πᾶσα ἡ περίχωρος τοῦ Ἰορδάνου*, *all the country along the Jordan*, which was *the plain of Jordan*. Hence, according to our author, the statement would be, *the inhabitants of the plain of Jordan WENT OUT of the plain, to John, to be baptized IN the plain of Jordan*. In what manner, and for what reason they *went out of the plain*, to be baptized *in the plain*, is extremely difficult to imagine. If we understand that they went out of their towns and villages in the adjacent country to be baptized in the river, nothing can be more natural and intelligible; but Mr. Ewing does not admire the inference which seems inevitable from such an interpretation, although, before this article is dismissed, it will be demonstrably shewn that this was the fact.

In the second place, the parallel and explanatory record of John (chap. i.) is completely corroborative of our interpretation: *ταῦτα ἐν Βηθαβαρᾷ ἐγένετο πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, ὅπου ἦν Ἰωάννης βαπτίζων*, “These things were done in Bethabara, *upon the Jordan*, where John was baptizing.” What Matthew calls

ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ, *in Jordan*, John, says Mr. Ewing, calls ἐν Βηθαβαρᾷ, *in Bethabara*. By no means: for he says not ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ, *in Jordan*, but ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ, *in the Jordan*, which is, in fact, an elliptical expression for ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ποταμῷ, *in the river Jordan*; precisely as we say, in English, *in the Thames*, that is, *in the river Thames*.

John moreover states, that Bethabara was πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, that is, observes our author, *beyond Jordan*, “I do not say at any distance from the river;” but he consents to adopt Dr. C.’s translation, “situate on the Jordan.” It happens that Bethabara was not only not at any distance from the river, but derived its name from its being the place of common ford of the river, where the Israelites crossed under Joshua. Literally, it is בית *beth*, a house, and עבר *gnabar*, a passage. The most important MSS. read *Bethany*, which, however, still signifies, by its etymology, “a place, or house, close by a ferry.”

In the third place, by consulting the testimony of Mark, we find incontestible proof in our favour. The several forms of expression occur in a manner that unquestionably and for ever settles the point. Mark i. 5. καὶ ἐβαπτίζοντο πάντες ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ποταμῷ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ “and were all baptised by him *IN THE RIVER JORDAN*.” V. 8. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἐβάπτισα ὑμᾶς ἐν ὕδατι “I indeed have baptized you *IN WATER*.” V. 9. καὶ ἐβαπτίσθη ὑπὸ Ἰωάννου εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην “and was baptized by John *IN THE JORDAN*.” It will be observed, that *in the Jordan*, in the latter quotation, is εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην, which Mr. Ewing would triumphantly have adduced as

a proof that it was *at* or *upon*, or *in the region* of Jordan, but he is prevented by the previous expression, *in the river Jordan*; and if either Greek or English could furnish a more explicit and decisive statement, I should be happy to know it. Mr. E. indeed insists, that it means, *the country on the banks*; but how, *in the river*, (for remark, it is ἐν, *in*, not ἐπὶ or πέραν, *upon*) can signify *the country on the banks*, is as inexplicable as that, *in the British channel*, should denote *in Dorsetshire*, or *in Devonshire*, each “a country on the banks!”

The real signification of the phrase is also very decidedly fixed by the several forms of expression in the Septuagint. “So the king returned, and came ἕως τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, *to the Jordan*.” (2 Sam. xix. 15.) The same words are used, 2 Kings vi. 2. and vii. 15. “And they two stood ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, *by the Jordan*.” (2 Kings ii. 7.) Elijah “took also the mantle of Elijah that fell from him, and went back, and stood ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, *upon the banks of the Jordan*.” (2 Kings ii. 13.) We request the learned reader to consult the several expressions in the Septuagint translation of the 3rd chapter of Joshua, where he will find *to the brink of the water—in the Jordan—unto the Jordan—the soles of the priests’ feet in the water—and dipped in the water—standing in the midst of the Jordan*, (v. 8. 13. 15. 17.) all confirmative of our usual mode of interpretation.

Dr. C. is next attacked for stating, that “both in sacred authors and in classical, it (βαπτίζειν) signifies *to dip, to plunge, to immerse*, and was rendered by Tertullian, the oldest of the Latin fathers, *tingere*, the term used for dyeing cloth, which was

by immersion." The objection is, that " he has not specified any of his sacred or classical authorities," and that " for deciding the meaning of a *Greek* word, Dr. C. refers us to the authority of the translation of it by a *Latin* father." The question is asked, " What should we have thought of Johnson's *English Dictionary*, if he had supported his explanations by authorities solely among the *French* writers?"

The *reason* Dr. C. did not " specify any of his sacred or classical authorities," was, that the use of the term βάπτω, and the frequentative βαπτίζω, was so notorious, and that *all the Lexicons*, Scapula, Schleusner, Hederic, Suicerus, &c. had so unanimously given *dipping, plunging, immersing*, as the original and most current idea, founded upon those authorities, that it would seem unnecessary to support by a citation of examples, what no competent and unprejudiced scholar denied. Classical authorities have been repeatedly, and we affirm triumphantly, as it regards the meaning assigned by *every Greek Lexicon*, adduced in the controversy. And I now once again demand of Mr. EWING TO POINT ME OUT THE LEXICON which does NOT give *dipping, plunging, or immersing*, as the *unquestionable, settled, and universally admitted* PRIMITIVE SIGNIFICATION of the contested terms.

It is moreover not correct to say, that Dr. C. appeals to a *Latin* father to decide the meaning of a *Greek* word. Far from it: he considers it as already decided, and appeals to Tertullian's translation as a *corroborative evidence*, as a proof, not only that *sacred* and *classical* writers and *Greek*

fathers, but *Latin authors* also, in fact, *the whole world*, and *every authority*, justify his interpretation. An unprejudiced eye must perceive, that Dr. Campbell refers to Tertullian solely for this purpose; and it was a wise appeal. He intimates, that Tertullian was the *oldest* of the Latin fathers; a designation which Mr. E. has chosen to overlook. But this is precisely the circumstance that rendered the appeal proper and important; for by this authority; it appears, that as soon as the Greek term began to be translated into other languages, its original and genuine signification was obviously understood. For the character of Tertullian, Mr. Ewing refers the reader to Mosheim and Lardner, "or any other writer on ecclesiastical antiquity;" leaving it to be supposed, that these authors would convince him that he was more of a child than a father in literature and theology. This implication, however, is wholly unfounded; and his references are, for himself, ill-chosen. Let us turn to the first. "Hitherto we have made no mention of the Latin writers, who employed their pens in the christian cause. And, indeed, the only one of any note we find in this country, is TERTULLIAN, by birth a Carthaginian.—He was a man of *extensive learning*, of a *fine genius*, and highly admired for his elocution in the Latin tongue. We have several works of his yet remaining, which were designed to *explain* and *defend the truth*, and to nourish pious affections in the hearts of christians." Again—"The most *eminent* and *learned* of all the followers of this rigid enthusiast (Montanus) was Tertullian, a man of

great learning and genius, but of an austere and melancholy natural temper.”*

It is surprising that Mr. E. should approve and adopt the slanderous insinuation in Stephens's *Thesaurus*, by Valpy. “Cyprian, as in other parts of his writings, so particularly in one of his epistles to Cæcilius, *on purpose*, as I think, translated βαρτίζοντες, by *Tingentes*.” The word used is *consilio*, with *design*, with a *crafty intention*. Mr. E. declares, “I believe it;” but upon what christian principle, and upon what historical evidence, he can vindicate such a direct charge of immoral principle, I am at a loss to conceive. He followed, it is said, Tertullian, *his master*; the latter, therefore, is to be regarded as the primary offender. If he followed his master, why is he to be impugned for a corrupt motive? or if he did so, Tertullian was the original and greatest transgressor, and the charge is indeed a most serious one:—this polemical sword cuts with a double edge at the christian character of both these ancient fathers; and I can only say, that I should not choose to take the responsibility of such an attack.

The reference to Johnson here is most unhappy: “What should we have thought of Johnson's *English Dictionary*, if he had supported his explanations by authorities solely among the *French* writers?” And what are we to think of the merits of a question, which is totally inapt and irrelevant? Does Dr. Campbell support his explanations *solely*

* MOSHEIM's *Eccles. Hist.* Cent. ii. p. 2. c. 2; and p. 2. c. 5.

by the *Latin* authorities? Does he not mention the *sacred* and the *classical* authors in general? Does he not name them *first*? And does he not, as we have shewn, incidentally allude to Tertullian as a *corroborative testimony*, being the *oldest* of the *Latin* fathers? Now if some, sixteen or eighteen centuries hence, a *Greek* or a *Turk*, should appeal to Johnson's Dictionary for the primary and current significations of an *English* word in the last century, and if he should find by a search into our authors, or by the testimony of our other lexicographers, that it had a particular meaning, he would be justified in pronouncing upon its application: but if his testimony should happen to be disputed, and the primary and current significations disclaimed by some ingenious writer who chose to maintain the *secondary* or the *least common uses of the term*, in order to support a system of opinion, or a mode of practice with regard to some public law, which the primary and current and generally received application of it would not suit,—then, if he could discover that the *French*, *Spanish*, *German*, or any other authors contemporary, or nearly contemporary with Johnson, and with the English classical writers of his day, in giving an account of the English law in question, adopted a word in their own respective languages which corresponded in meaning with the primary and current senses of the English term, it would furnish a strong corroborative proof, that it was not the *secondary* or *rare* and very disputable applications of it which, in that age, were employed in representing the public law or institution in

question. So much for the propriety of Dr. C.'s appeal, and so much for the statements of his objector!

In remarking upon Mat. iii. 16. "Jesus when he was baptized went up straightway *out of* the water," Mr. E. expresses himself thus—"I suppose that *no man upon earth* who can read ἀνέβη εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος, imagines it to be any thing else than 'he went up straightway *from* the water.'" It is presumable, notwithstanding the hostility against Dr. Campbell, that he was at least *able to read* the words recited; and yet he *imagined* them to mean "he no sooner *arose out of* the water." *Vossius, Venema, Doddridge*, and a thousand others were certainly *able to read* these words, and yet they *imagined* them to have a meaning different from the interpretation of our Glasgow friend, and conformable to that of the Principal of Marischal College, and of almost all the critics, both Baptist and Pædobaptist! If our brethren appeal to authorities, we have no objection; if they proceed on another ground we are still ready to be guided by the Horatian maxim—

"Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri."

I perceive nothing in the remark of Mr. Ewing on Dr. Campbell's translation of Mark vii. 3, 4, to detain us. He has produced no evidence whatever to weaken the force of Dr. Campbell's critical observations, who has shewn to a demonstration that the sense is confused by our translators having adopted the *same* word to translate two

very *different ones* in the original; and that consequently the true rendering is, as the Principal has given it—"The Pharisees, and indeed all the Jews, observing the tradition of the elders, eat not until they have *washed their hands, by pouring a little water upon them* (νίψωνται;) and if they come from the market *by dipping them*, (βαπτίζωνται)."

Dr. Lightfoot remarks—"The Jews used the washing of the hands, and the plunging of the hands; and the word νίψωνται, *wash*, in our evangelist seems to answer to the former, and βαπτίζωνται, *baptize*, to the latter." The statement of Grotius is—"They purified themselves with greater care from pollution contracted at the market, not only by *washing their hands*, but by *immersing their whole body*." Vatablus expresses the same opinion; others consider it only an immersion of the arms; and others, of the hands—in either case the argument is ours: the action was not *sprinkling*, or *pouring*, but *dipping*.

Our author is displeased with Dr. Campbell's eulogium upon Wetstein, who says that βαπτίζεσθαι, is *to immerse the hands in water*: νίπτεσθαι, *to pour water on the hands*. Whether Wetstein deserved to be called "an excellent critic" or not, is of no moment; Dr. Campbell's opinion, especially when it is coincident with that of all the authorities, is not to be despised, or set aside by the stroke of a pen.

Few persons will read without astonishment the statement—"I have always had little confidence in his (Dr. C.'s) making a conscientious confession of the whole counsel of God. He seems to have

had a vanity in patronizing what he did not practise. The passage on this subject (*baptism*) in his Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence" (*in which he refers to a disputant who, in defiance of etymology and use, maintained that baptize means more properly to sprinkle than to plunge, and in defiance of all antiquity, that the former method was the earliest, and long the most general practice*), "is nothing but a specimen of the easy confidence with which he could impute dogmatism to others, while he was dogmatizing himself with the most glaring licence," p. 88. Dr. Campbell destitute of CONSCIENCE, of HUMILITY, and of ARGUMENT!!! But why is his memory to be blasted with these tremendous accusations?—Because he has asserted, that βάπτω and βαπτίζω, signify to *plunge*, to *dip*, to *immerse*, which multitudes of the most eminent pædobaptist critics had previously declared; and because again he has intimated, that to affirm that the word *baptize* means *more properly to sprinkle* than to *plunge* is to defy *etymology and use*, and to say that *sprinkling* was the *earliest* practice, is to defy *all antiquity*. At the hazard of incurring similar charges, I distinctly *re-affirm* the same, and venture to add, that Dr. Campbell had the *best reasons* for what he stated, and three witnesses to the truth of it, whose testimony no sophistry or cross-examination can overthrow—ETYMOLOGY, USE and ANTIQUITY! Mr. Ewing *knows well* that EVERY AUTHORITY is against him, and in favour of Dr. Campbell. If Mr. Ewing or any of his brethren will produce me A SINGLE CASE, in which it is shewn that *sprinkling* is more

properly the radical idea than *plunging*, I will concede the *etymological point* at once ; and if he or any of his brethren will bring forward ONE SINGLE INSTANCE ONLY of infant sprinkling from the New Testament or the Old, or ONE SINGLE COMMAND inculcating the practice, I will instantly concede the *practical point*, and attach myself to the Pædobaptist denomination. Will Mr. Ewing or any of his brethren VENTURE TO GIVE ME A SIMILAR PLEDGE ?—

BRIEF ANSWERS TO VARIOUS SCATTERED
CRITICISMS.

HAVING disposed of the two grand novelties which our Author has pressed into the service of this controversy, and of his remarks on Dr. Campbell; I propose to furnish answers in the briefest form to the other criticisms, of a subordinate description, which lie dispersed through his volume.

ACTS -ii. 2, 3, 4.

Καὶ ἐγένετο ἄφνω ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἦχος ὥσπερ φερομένης ωνοῆς βιαίας, καὶ ἐπλήρωσεν ὅλον τὸν οἶκον οὓ ἦσαν καθήμενοι. Καὶ ὤφθησαν αὐτοῖς διαμεριζόμεναι γλώσσαι ὥσεί πυρὸς, ἐκάθισέ τε ἐφ' ἓνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν. Καὶ ἐπλήσθησαν ἅπαντες Πνεύματος ἁγίου, καὶ ἤρξαντο λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις, καθὼς τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐδίδου αὐτοῖς ἀποφθέγγεσθαι.—

“ And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them: And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance.”

In translating this passage, Mr. Ewing has marked emphatically the phrase—“a flame SAT DOWN upon every one of them.” This, however,

is far from affording any assistance to his general argument; for it would be extremely difficult to discover any analogy between *pouring* or *sprinkling* and *sitting down*: or, perhaps it will be said, between sitting down and *immersing*. True; but we neither require nor plead for such an illustration, as will be immediately explained.

Citations are introduced to prove, that the Holy Spirit is represented as *descending from above*, and as *poured out* upon all flesh, from which is to be deduced the propriety of pouring in baptism. But the fallacy of this reasoning is obvious; for the inspired expression is not “the Spirit *descended*,” or “the Spirit *was poured out*,” but “a sound like that of a violent wind, ἐπλήρωσεν ὅλον τὸν οἶκον, FILLED the whole house,”—and “they were all ἐπλήσθησαν, FILLED with the Holy Spirit.” It will be alleged that in adducing the prophecy of Joel, Peter uses the words ἐκχεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματός μου, “I will pour out of my Spirit;” and afterwards ἐξέχεε τοῦτο, “he hath shed forth, (or poured out) this;” and that this was the accomplishment of the promise of *baptism with the Spirit*. But *what* was the accomplishment of the promise? And *what* do the words, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον διὰ τοῦ προφήτου Ἰωήλ—“this is the very thing spoken of by the prophet Joel,”—signify? The promise refers to the *whole of the communication and its results*, not to the *mode* of that communication. I might as well affirm that the *baptism with the Holy Spirit* refers to the *sound* of the wind, or the *appearance* of the cloven tongues, as that it refers to the *pouring out* of the Spirit, or his *descending* from

above. The promise was not to the circumstance of the *pouring out*, or to the circumstance of the *descent* of the Holy Spirit; but to their being *replenished, imbued, extraordinarily possessed*, with this divine energy. Perfectly coincident with this idea is the phraseology in Matthew; which is not “he shall *pour* water upon you, and *pour* fire upon you, but αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν Πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ, he shall baptize you *in the Holy Spirit, and in fire.*” The latter expression is peculiarly confirmatory of our interpretation; for few persons, whether critics or not, will be disposed to understand the phrase as signifying *pouring fire upon you*, (which is in fact neither Greek nor English,) but as denoting the *entire circumstance* of their *abundant repletion* with the heavenly influences.

If, in the prophecy of Joel, or in the other recited passages, the word βάπτω were used in describing the *mode* of imparting the Spirit, there might be some plausibility at least in the argument of our opponents, of which however at present it is absolutely devoid. In *no one instance* is the controverted term employed to represent the communication of divine influences: the phrases are—“except a man *be born* (γεννηθῇ) of water,”—“ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is *come upon* you, (ἐπελθόντος)”—“I will *pour out* (ἐκχεῶ) my Spirit,”—“the Holy Ghost *fell* (ἐπέπεσε) upon them.” If the reference, in the allusion to the bestowment of the Spirit under the figure of baptism, were to the *mode* of the communication, it seems inevitable that some one of these terms

would have been used in the allusive passage; but neither of them occurs; another, and totally different one is introduced. Is it alleged—"but it is expressly said, 'Ye shall be *baptized* with the Holy Ghost and with fire?'"—This is all we require; the objection is a virtual concession. It is not declared—"Ye shall be *poured upon, fallen upon, come upon,*" but (the inspired writer using a *different* word) "*Ye shall be baptized.*" It is quite obvious, therefore, that although the bestowment of the Holy Spirit be represented figurately as descending from above like "every good and perfect gift," yet the *result* of that communication, *the state of repletion* with these influences, is very differently described—it is called BAPTISM. A person may indeed be *immersed* by means of pouring, but *immersion* is *the being plunged into water, or overwhelmed* by it; and no one of the terms employed to represent the *mode* of imparting the Spirit, can describe the *effect* of the communication. Were the water to *ascend* from the earth, it would still be *baptism*, were the person wholly covered with it. Both the literal and figurative uses of the word *immersion* are precisely similar in the English language.

TITUS iii. 5.

Κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ ἔλεον ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς, διὰ λουτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας, καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως Πνεύματος ἁγίου· "According to his mercy he saved us by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost."

The question is, what is denoted by "*the wash-*"

ing of regeneration?—It will be admitted to signify *cleansing* and *entire cleansing*, or the purification of the soul for the service of God. Let us inquire what is intended by *regeneration*? Does it signify the *manner* in which the Spirit operates upon the heart, or does it refer solely to the *whole effect* produced? The latter is unquestionable: regeneration is the *entire change* of heart, produced by divine influences: consequently the *washing* of regeneration is the operation of *cleansing the whole moral man*—removing his impurities by a spiritual process upon the entire system; as we may imagine the body is cleansed by *bathing*, or “washing in pure water.”

In the New Testament there are two verbs used in the sense of *washing*, *νίπτω* and *λύνω*; the former signifies to wash a part of the body; the latter means to bathe the whole body, from which it will be seen that the noun in the above recited passage is derived. In John xiii. 10. the distinction is expressly remarked—ὁ λελουμένος οὐ χρειαν ἔχει ἡ τοὺς πόδας νίψασθαι, ἀλλ’ ἔστι καθαρὸς ὅλος; the participle *λελουμένος*, is used of him whose *whole body* is washed, and the verb *νίψασθαι*, is joined with *τοὺς πόδας*, the *feet*. This is Dr. Campbell’s remark.

Let it be recollected further, that *λουτρὸν*, is the common word for *bath*; it is continually applied by the ancients to designate the *baptistry*, and to denote *baptism*. Whether correct in their interpretation or not, it is evident in what sense they understood the word.

MAT. XX. 22, 23.—LUKE xii. 50.

Δύνασθε πιεῖν τὸ ποτήριον ὃ ἐγὼ μέλλω πίνειν, καὶ τὸ βάπτισμα, ὃ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι, βαπτισθῆναι; Δέγουσιν αὐτῷ· Δυνάμεθα. καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· Τὸ μὲν ποτήριόν μου πίεσθε, καὶ τὸ βάπτισμα, ὃ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι, βαπτισθήσεσθε· κ. τ. λ.
βάπτισμα δὲ ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι, καὶ πῶς συνέχομαι ἕως οὗ τελεσθῇ.

“Are ye able to drink of the cup that I shall drink of, and to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with? They say unto him, we are able. And he saith unto them, ye shall indeed drink of my cup, and be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with,” &c.

“I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!”

The *cup* and the *baptism* contain, (says Mr. Ewing) *one* allusion, and the latter expression means, “I have a cup to drink of.” As he endeavours to shew that *baptism* may be *drinking*, as “out of the cup of nature,” that is, the hollow of the hand, it is obvious that by “one allusion,” is meant “one thing,” which is surely a most unsolid and sophistical interpretation; and after all, we are left to conjecture, which of the numerous operations brought under review, is intended by baptism—Is it *popping*, or *staining*, or *painting*, or *sprinkling*, or *pouring*, or *drinking*?—The assertion would appear just as tenable, that *drinking of a cup*, and *being immersed in water*, are one and the same action! “*I have a baptism to be baptized with*,” said our divine Redeemer: No, exclaims the critic, it does not mean so; it signifies, “I

HAVE A CUP TO DRINK OF!!" The reasoning would be equally legitimate were our author to state, that in one passage Christ affirms, "I am the door;" and in another, "I am the vine;" but these are one and the same; there is "one allusion," that is, the allusion is to one person; consequently, the phrase, "I AM THE DOOR," means "I AM THE VINE!"

JOHN THE BAPTIST.

"Poor Joannes de Dooper, *John the Dipper*, as the Dutch Bible calls him—what an amphibious life must he have lived!—There went to John "Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, and were baptized" by him alone. This must have been a work of time; and, on the supposition of his immersing them, he could be little out of the water from morning to night, as long as his public ministry lasted. His legs and arms at least, whatever more of him, must have been soon excoriated by the friction of his soaking "camel's hair garment." The leathern girdle about his loins must have become good for nothing before the end of the first day." p. 119.

Passing over the sarcasm of this passage, I would simply inquire, whether John must not have been as much *overwhelmed* with fatigue, upon the supposition of his sprinkling, or *pouring upon*, every person "in Jerusalem and all Judea," as upon that of his immersing them; nay, his work must have been far more extensive and laborious, for our notions would save him the trouble of all

the children, which were, perhaps, two-thirds of the population.

The incontestible reply, however, to this insinuation is, that "Jerusalem and all Judea," resembles numberless other hyperbolical modes of speech, which are employed to represent "great multitudes."

John iii. 23.

Ἦν δὲ καὶ Ἰωάννης βαπτίζων ἐν Αἰνῶν ἐγγὺς τοῦ Σαλείμ, ὅτι ὕδατα πολλὰ ἦν ἐκεῖ. "And John also was baptizing in Enon, near to Salim, because there was much water there."

Mr. Ewing insists, that αἰνῶν is the oriental word for a *fountain*; and that it is the Greek expression of the Syro-Chaldaic plural. "The place there was called *fountains*, because there were many *fountains* there." Being courteously disposed, we accede to this interpretation. Well then, Ænon was so called, because there were anciently fountains there. Why then did John baptize there—because there were *many* FOUNTAINS? By no means; "because there were *many* WATERS:" for remark, ὕδατα πολλὰ signifies the latter, not the former: and ὕδατα can never be forced to mean *fountains*. Whatever then might have occasioned the original designation of that locality, another reason influenced John to select it for the practice of the new rite. From many fountains, many waters flow, either in parallel or confluent streams; and though the original name respected the fountains, the baptism of John was practised, according to the express testimony of

inspiration, “because there was *much water*, (or *many waters*) there.” Mr. Ewing is quite certain of convincing his reader, from this circumstance, that ὕδατα πολλὰ, signifies “*small streams*.” I should entertain no apprehension of exposing myself to ridicule, were I to argue that even “small streams,” unless they were demonstrably mere *rills*, might be understood to refer to streams large enough at least for the purpose of immersion: this, however, is not requisite; and we not only deny that it *ever* means “small streams,” but confront the evasive argument of our opponent by a few references to the current acceptation of the terms. In the often cited verse of Rev. i. 15. the voice of Christ is described as the *sound* ὑδάτων πολλῶν, of *many waters*.” In the same apocalyptic vision, chap. xvii. 1. the great whore is said to sit ἐπὶ τῶν ὑδάτων τῶν πολλῶν “*upon many waters*,” referring to multitudes of nations. In the Septuagint translation, we have “Thy way is in the sea, and thy path—ἐν ὑδάσι πολλοῖς “*in many waters*.” (Eng. Tr. *the great waters*.) Ps. lxxvii. 18. Again, “They that go down to the sea, that do business ἐν ὑδάσι πολλοῖς, “*in many waters*.” (Eng. Tr. *in great waters*.) The phraseology in question is evidently a Hebraism, and synonymous with a *great abundance of water*.

FAMILY BAPTISMS.

Acts x. 47, 48. They were commanded to be *baptized*, who had *believed*, (v. 45.) and who had “*received the Holy Ghost*.” How can this support the pædobaptist cause?

Acts xvi. 15. Because the term *household* is used, our brethren demand of us a demonstration that there were *not* infants, and in consequence choose to infer that there *were*. This argument might be valid if there never were any households without children, or if the circumstances compelled us to the conclusion, that they were attached to the family of Lydia. Our brethren will not, for a moment, assert the former, and the *whole narrative* precludes the supposition of the latter. To say nothing of the preceding verse (v. 13,) in which it is stated, that they went to *the river side*, be it observed, that the very mention of “*Lydia and her household*,” implies the case of an *unmarried head of a family*. She was, moreover, not a resident in the place, but on a journey of business, and the natural conclusion is, that her “household” were the servants she hired *pro tempore*. It is in the highest degree improbable, if she had children, that she would have brought them to Thyatira on such an occasion, unless our friends will adopt the supposition, of its being a journey of pleasure, or for the restoration of health, resembling a modern month’s excursion to a watering-place: in this case, however, there appears no reason for the mention of her business, as “a seller of purple.” Besides, if the household of Lydia were *baptized* on account of her personal faith, that of the jailor was *saved* for a similar reason; the latter is thus appealed to by Paul, “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house.”

Acts xvi. 33. The jailor, and all his, were bap-

tized ; but, unfortunately for our pædobaptist brethren, both with regard to this instance, and as explanatory of the former, it is recorded, “they spake unto him the word of the Lord, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ αὐτοῦ, and to ALL those who were in his house.” It is added, these were the very persons who were ALL immediately baptized—οἱ αὐτοῦ πάντες.

1 Cor. i. 16. and xvi. 15. In the first passage, it is Ἐβάπτισά δὲ καὶ τὸν Στεφανᾶ οἶκον, “and I baptized also the *house* of Stephanas ;” in the second, οἶδατε τὴν οἰκίαν Στεφανᾶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀχαίας, καὶ εἰς διακονίαν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἔταξαν ἑαυτούς. “Ye know the *family* (or *household*) of Stephanus, that it is the first- (*fruits*) of Achaia, and they have devoted themselves to serving the saints.” Here the house, household, or family, by whatever term they are designated, who were baptized, were the identical persons who served, or ministered to the saints with affectionate assiduity, and who were the first-*fruits*, or first *converts* of Achaia.

Upon these instances, which our author admits are all that can be adduced (p. 134,) I may remark generally, that there is only one, that of Lydia, which contains even the shadow of a possibility that infants were included ; and with regard to this particular case, not only is every question on the subject settled, as we believe, by the preceding explanations, but even pædobaptist writers themselves say, “whether infants were in the house is *uncertain!*”

DIRECT ARGUMENTS.

The reader is now prepared to appreciate Mr. Ewing's assertion, when introducing the above recited examples:—"Nothing can be more direct and obvious than the argument from Scripture for infant baptism." Allow me to inquire, what is a *direct* and *obvious* argument? It is an argument surely founded upon *direct* and *positive* evidence, that is, upon a plain, unequivocal statement of a fact. Permit me again to ask, is there in any of these narratives, such a statement of the baptism of *infants*? Are they once *named*? Nothing, on the contrary, can be more *indirect*, *confused*, and *illogical*, than the deductions from these passages. Were I to assert, that nothing can be more *direct* and *obvious* than the argument from Scripture for *adult baptism*, I should at once be able to produce a proof, and a proof so incontestible, that no pædobaptist *can* deny it; and the only crevice out of which he can creep from the conclusion is, that *infants* are *not excluded*. My assertion he is *utterly unable* to deny—his own he is as unable to *substantiate*. No sophistry can refute the fact, that Christ was of an adult age, that the eunuch was of an adult age, that the Philippian jailor, Lydia, Stephanus, were all of an adult age—*Ex his discennes*.

Another *direct* argument is,—“there were always children *in attendance* during our Saviour's ministry; therefore, it is to be inferred, he *baptized*

them." Perhaps, however, this will not appear *quite* so *direct* upon quoting the words of the evangelical historian: — " Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples." That he *noticed* them, is frequently mentioned—that he *baptized* them, or ordered them to be baptized, NEVER!—This is a sufficient reply to the other passages adduced.

We are requested to remark, with reference to Mat. xix. 13—15, that our Saviour's condescension displayed so beautifully both to children and parents, is by no means *exclusive* of the baptism of the former, p. 138. This is the third case of *direct* and *obvious* argument: let those who feel its force, be convinced by it.

Mr. Ewing refers to Acts ii. 38, 39. This appears to be contrary to his wish or thought, a *direct* and *obvious* argument for *adult* persons. "The promise is to *you* and *your children*." Not to insist, that the meaning is explained by the subsequent phrase, "as many as the Lord our God shall *call*,"—not to insist also, that the term *children*, is continually used for *posterity*—the interpretation, in this instance, is determined by the fact, that the *promise* relates exclusively to *the gift of the Holy Spirit*, predicted by Joel, which surely does not belong to *infants*: with regard to their *baptism*, there exists no promise whatever.

Ἀπὸ, ἐκ, εἰς, ἐν.

The criticisms of opposing parties on these propositions, are comparatively immaterial, and in whatever manner adjusted, they must be deemed insufficient of themselves to determine the controversy. The observations contained in the Appendix upon this subject, and intended as a vindication of Mr. E.'s explanations in his Grammar and Lexicon, have an especial reference to some remarks of my aged and venerable friend, Dr. RYLAND. I shall content myself with inserting an extract of a letter recently received from him, in which he refers to Mr. Ewing's statement. He thus writes :—

“ The great question is, *if* the New Testament historians *had* intended to express going down *into* the water, and coming up *out of* it, would it have been natural to them to select stronger terms than they have actually used? unless, indeed, they had been aware, that the fact would be disputed, and so have used repeated phrases to guard against the possibility of its being denied. If Carey or Ward had sent home an account of their baptisms *in* the Ganges, or *in* a tank, would they have used stronger expressions? If they had employed the word *dip*, it might be said, *dip* often means a *partial dipping* only; for I *dip* my pen in ink, and yet *dip* only the nib of it.

“ P. 185. ‘ ἐκ θρόνου *cannot* mean out of a throne.’—189. ‘ not worthy to sit *on* the king's

throne. What would Dr. R. make of *to* or *into* here?—I should not think of *to*, sure enough, which is his favourite; but I should have no objection to using *in*. Only substitute *chair of state*, for throne, and what Englishman would say, she cannot rise *out of* it unquestionably! or that it is absurd to talk of sitting *in* it? We commonly employ *on*, with reference to a throne, as being ‘high and lifted up,’ and conveying a stronger idea of dignity; but we speak as often, at this end of the island, of sitting *in* a chair, especially *in* an arm-chair, as of sitting *on* it, and also of rising *out of* it. However, if it were true, that ἐκ θρονων could not mean *out of* a throne, would it follow, that ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος does not imply the idea of having been in the water? Would not the very same expression have been used, if the person had been *in* it, and came *out of* it?

“ Mr. Ewing says, ‘write *upon* the water, certainly not in it.’ I think the contrary is certain; that the finger, or style, or stick, is supposed to go *into* the water, though let it go ever so deep, the impression would be only momentary. But if the writer were supposed to hold the instrument with which he wrote above the water, so as not to penetrate it for one moment, the force of the expression would be lost. A different preposition is used, John vi. 19. περιπατοῦντα ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης, walking on the sea.

“ 190. I certainly believe our Lord went *up into* the mountain, that is, not just *to* the foot of it; but within a line which might have been drawn

round its circumference, though not sinking into the substance of it. Comp. Exod. xix. 12.

“I also think it exceedingly probable, that Peter went *into* the sea in a boat, which seems to have been his common practice, instead of casting his hook as he stood on the shore.

“Quibbles ‘may be multiplied without end,’ till the common people are persuaded, that nothing can be determinately expressed by the Greek prepositions. But though Mr. Ewing seems to think, that he has *popped upon* a better mode of settling this controversy, than any of his brethren thought of before him, yet I am as far as ever from being convinced, that we do not follow the directions and example of our Lord and his apostles. Mr. Ewing, however, appears to consider it as more difficult reverently to submit to infallible authority, in respect of one man’s immersing another, than in the rite to which Joshua attended at Gilgal, chap. v. I cannot account for his feelings.”

AN EXAMINATION OF DR. DWIGHT'S DIS-
COURSES ON BAPTISM, IN HIS WORK,
ENTITLED, "THEOLOGY EXPLAINED AND
DEFENDED."

THE celebrity of the writer, not the force of his arguments, induces me to notice distinctly, but briefly, the erroneous statements of Dr. Dwight, on the subject of baptism. They occur in the volumes, entitled "Theology," which have obtained an extensive circulation in this country; but, in remarking upon them, so far am I from any desire to detract from the general merits of the publication, that I hail its appearance, and rejoice in its popularity.

The discourses in question comprehend a view of the reality and intention of baptism—the objections against infant baptism—the direct arguments in its favour—the subjects—and the mode of its administration.

In the first of these Sermons, there are many just and important sentiments, and only one passage that requires particular animadversion. The Doctor states, that "when children die in infancy, and are scripturally dedicated to God in baptism, there is much, and very consoling reason furnished, to believe that they are accepted beyond

the grave." He further says, "there is, I think, reason to hope well concerning other children, dying in infancy; but there is certainly peculiar reason for christian parents to entertain strong consolation with regard to *their* offspring."

Will it be believed, that the only passages Dr. Dwight adduces, in support of his theory, are in *direct opposition* to it? Yet such is the fact; and how so sensible a divine could have been betrayed into such an inconsistency, seems really inexplicable; unless it be imputed to the grossest prejudice. He quotes from Matt. xxi. 16. "Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings, thou hast perfected praise;" which is our Saviour's application of the prophecy in the viiith Psalm, to the circumstance of the children in the temple, crying "Hosannah to the Son of David." What application have these passages to the *baptism* of infants, or to their *dying in infancy*? Dr. Dwight, indeed, has attempted to excite in his reader's mind the idea that there is some relevancy, by insinuating that "it is, perhaps, improper to say, that praise is perfected on this side of heaven." How can it be improper to say so when Christ has himself declared, that it was the case—that, in whatever sense the term is to be understood, it was *perfected* in the celebrations of the children in the temple? Besides, whether perfected in heaven or on earth, were these exulting children *infants*, and were they the *baptized* offspring of *believing* parents? Dr. Dwight also adduces—"Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." Did they come to be

baptized? Surely not, but to be “*blessed*.” Were these little children the offspring of *believing parents*—and is the language *exclusive* in its meaning, or *discriminating* in its terms? Were they not a promiscuous assemblage? And admitting that the words are applicable to the state beyond the grave, do they not comprehend all children—children *as such*—children of every class?—The only other citation is, “The promise is to you and to your children;” and the comment is sufficiently curious—“*If* this promise is extended in any sense to those who die in infancy, and conveys to them any blessings, they must be found beyond the grave.” Whether any one ever thought of so extending it, or whether the Doctor intended his doubt to be taken for proof, we cannot tell; in either case, the statement does not merit a formal refutation. Where then is the “*peculiar reason*,” for the exclusive consolation which christian parents may, it is supposed, entertain? And why, if baptism is to confer the heavenly glory, is there *reason* to “hope well” of “other children?”—Really, the confusion that pervades this whole paragraph, is such, that had it been found in the work of a judicious and sensible divine of a distant age and another language, few critics would have hesitated in pronouncing, from intrinsic evidence, upon its spuriousness!

The next discourse relates to the proper subjects of baptism; these are, it is said, “all those who believe in Christ, and publicly profess their faith in him,” and “the infant children of believers:” the latter doctrine, it is added, has been

extensively disputed and denied ; Dr. D. therefore proposes to state, and answer the objections against it. I shall not now inquire, whether he has omitted to mention any of the objections, but examine his replies to those which he has introduced. For the sake both of brevity and perspicuity, I shall adopt a methodical arrangement of the objections, the Doctor's answer, and my own reply.

Obj. 1. “ It is stated by the opposers of this doctrine (Infant Baptism,) that it is not enjoined by any express declaration in the Scriptures.”

Dr. D.'s Answer. There are many duties incumbent on us which are neither expressly commanded nor declared in Scripture. The principle on which the objection is founded is, “ nothing is our duty which is not thus commanded or declared in the Scriptures.” According to this, women are under no obligation to celebrate the Lord's Supper—parents to pray for their children—mankind to observe the Sabbath—rulers to defend the country, or to punish crime. It is impossible the Scriptures should specify all the doctrines and duties necessary to be believed and practised.

Reply. Dr. Dwight has confounded in his argument, the obvious distinction between a positive duty and a moral obligation. A moral duty is *commanded*, because it is *right* ; a positive institute is only *right*, because it is *commanded*. All moral duties arise out of general principles ; the principles being given, the diversified application of those principles does not require to be stated in

detail. For instance; the kind offices of the good Samaritan were not performed from obedience to any specific command; but his sympathies being excited by distress, his duty arose out of the principle involved in the general precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." On the other hand, all positive institutions are founded on express Scriptural directions; so that the obligation to observe them can be traced to no other source than simply the expression of the divine will. Consider for a moment the flexibility of Dr. Dwight's argument, and how a Protestant would be annoyed by it were it in the hands of a Papist. The latter would require nothing more of his Protestant antagonist, than the admission of a principle which should confound this distinction. Once admit the inferential reasoning with regard to positive institutes, which is legitimate as applied to moral duties, and you open a door wide enough to admit all the mummeries of Popery.

Obj. 2. "There is no certain example of infant baptism in the Scriptures."

Dr. D.'s Answer. There is no instance in which it is declared in so many terms that infants were baptized. There are instances in which the fact is involved:—*house* and *household* denote children.

Reply. If, according to the doctor's concession, there is no instance in which it is declared infants were baptized, the objection is valid; for of course there *could be*, by his own shewing, *no example* of infant baptism. If it were even *involved*,

there is still no *example*; it is only *inference*, and an inference which has nothing to sustain it; for that *house* and *household* necessarily denote children we deny, both on critical and historical grounds.

Obj. 3. "Children cannot be the subjects of faith; and faith is a necessary qualification for baptism."

Dr. D.'s Answer. John the Baptist was filled with the Holy Ghost from the womb; and was "unquestionably *a subject of faith in such a manner, that had he died in infancy he would certainly have been received to heaven.*"

Reply. The doctor has confounded the distinction between faith and holiness. An infant may be sanctified from the womb, but cannot believe. The remark, therefore, amounts to nothing, as directed against the principle which requires *faith*, not *holiness*, as a prerequisite to baptism.

Obj. 4. "Infants cannot make a profession of faith; and such a profession is a necessary qualification for baptism."

Dr. D.'s Answer. That a profession of faith is necessary in all instances cannot be proved. Cornelius and they that were with him made no such profession, and none was demanded by Peter, Acts xi.

Reply. Of the persons in question it is said that they *spake with tongues*, and *magnified God*. The Doctor has not informed us how those who spake with tongues, and magnified God, were *silent* and *passive* recipients of baptism! Suppose, however, it were proved that a *profession* of faith

was not demanded, did the apostles dispense with the *possession* of that principle? It is for the *possession* of faith we contend, and for the *evidence* of that possession. The objection is not fairly stated: we demand either profession or evidence in all cases; the latter is generally given by means of the former, as well as by the general conduct of the individual. But infants are incapable either of professing or giving evidence of that of which they cannot be the subjects.

Obj. 5. "Persons baptized in infancy prove that they were improper candidates for this ordinance by the future degeneracy of their conduct."

Dr. D.'s Answer. The real amount of this objection is, that no persons can be proper subjects of baptism, to the human eye, who, after their reception of this sacrament, prove themselves to be unrenewed. The objection fails because it proves too much. If we are required to baptize none but those who are regenerated, it is necessary we should know whether the candidates are regenerated or not.

Reply. It is necessary that we should have satisfactory *evidence* of the regeneration of the candidate for baptism prior to the performance of the rite; to *know* what is the state of the heart is the exclusive prerogative of Deity. With respect to those who have arrived at the period of personal responsibility evidences may be obtained, according to our Saviour's declaration, "By their fruits ye shall know them:" *they* are capacitated to repent, and to "bring forth fruits meet for repentance." But what can be said of unconscious

infants, who are altogether incapable of supplying evidence of any kind that they are the proper subjects of baptism, if the sanctification of their incipient powers be a prerequisite to the administration of this ordinance? They are heirs of a depraved nature; and what evidence can any one give that he is or ever will be the subject of that grace which alone can sanctify the soul? That all are not renewed in infancy is lamentably evinced by the subsequent lives of thousands with regard to whom the symbolical representation of their regenerate state is awfully premature. That some may be sanctified from the womb we do not question; but we possess no means of distinguishing between them and others; the difference, wide as it is, can only be evident to him in whose purposes of sovereign mercy they are included. This, however, is not the condition of adults, who are both capable of professing their faith in Christ, and of proving the genuineness of their profession by the purity of their conduct. That these signs may, in some instances, be counterfeited is nothing to the purpose. In fact, Dr. Dwight has confounded the distinction between being misled by *false evidence*, and acting *without any evidence at all*. A jury may be deceived, and often have been, by false and perjured witnesses; but who would thence infer the safety of condemning men without evidence? The application of the principle of Dr. Dwight's argument to judicial proceedings will at once illustrate its fallacy. It would be a singular position, indeed, that the *absence of all evidence* is a sufficient ground of ac-

tion. The question, therefore, returns,—Would the apostles have baptized any one *without even the slightest evidence that the candidate was the subject of that moral transformation which the rite of baptism was designed to symbolize?* Let our opponents seriously consider and candidly answer this question.

Obj. 6. “All baptized persons are, by that class of Christians to whom I have attached myself, considered as members of the Christian church; yet those who are baptized in infancy are not treated as if they possessed this character. Particularly they are not admitted to the sacramental supper, nor made subjects of ecclesiastical discipline.”

Dr. D.'s Answer. The conduct and opinions of those with whom I am connected are, in a greater or less degree, erroneous and indefensible. If baptized infants are members of the Christian church, we are bound to determine and declare the nature and extent of their membership. That they are members of the church I believe. All persons are baptized not *in* but *into* the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; that is, they are introduced into the family of God, and are called *godly, christians, spiritual, sons and daughters of God, and children of God*, throughout the Scriptures. All persons baptized, therefore, are members of the Christian church. Still they are not members in the sense commonly intended by the term. The word *church* has various significations; denoting the *invisible* kingdom of Christ, consisting of all who are *sanctified*—the *visible*

kingdom, consisting of all who have publicly professed religion, and their baptized offspring—*any body of christians*, holding the same doctrines, and united in the same worship and discipline—and christians who worship together in the *same place*. Hence, when persons baptized in infancy, are said to be members of the church, the word cannot be used in all these senses, and therefore something beside baptism, or a profession of religion, is necessary to constitute a membership of any particular church. When persons are dismissed from one church to another, they are not members of any particular church till they have united to the other church in form. A minister, by his ordination, is constituted not a minister of a particular church, but of the christian church at large: hence, a person may be a member of the church at large, and not a member of a particular church. When the eunuch was baptized, he became a member of the church general only, not of any particular church. Thus persons baptized in infancy, are members of the *church of Christ*, that is, of the *church general*. Baptism renders any person capable of membership in a particular church, if he is disposed and otherwise prepared; but neither this, nor his profession of religion, will constitute him such a member: this is to be done only by means of a covenant between him and the church. Persons baptized in infancy, are baptized on the ground of that profession of religion which their parents have made—whenever they themselves make the same profession, they become entitled to communion at the sacramental table. I have there-

fore shewn, that a profession of religion is necessary to constitute us members of the church of Christ, and that what may be called a church covenant is indispensable to constitute us members of particular churches.

Reply. At the very outset of this statement, our opponent is guilty of the most glaring sophism. He dexterously changes the term, *baptized infants*, to *persons*, adding, they are introduced into the family of God, and are called godly, christians, spiritual, sons and daughters of God, and children of God. But *who* are so introduced, and so called? *Baptized infants*, or *persons*? Dr. Dwight himself, at the conclusion of the passage, denies that the former are introduced into the family of God, for he declares, that baptism only renders a person *capable of membership if he is disposed*. Perhaps, it may be said, that he limits the statement here to a *particular church*: be it so—will our pædobaptist brethren admit, that baptized infants are introduced into the family of God? Here is, in fact, another sophism, lurking under a change of expression; for the argument would fail, even upon his own principles, unless the phrases, *church general*, and *family of God*, were to be deemed synonymous. But even a profligate may be a member of the *church general*, if baptized in infancy, using the term in the vague sense in which our author employs it; for, according to him, that is sufficient to constitute such membership; but, is a profligate therefore introduced into *the family of God*? If not, then baptized infants are not so introduced, although adult *persons* may, by giving

evidence of their piety: in this case, however, the two phrases have different significations, and yet are applied to the same thing. Besides, are *baptized infants* denominated *godly, christians, spiritual, sons and daughters of God, and children of God*? Our opponents will not contend it; consequently, though *persons* (or individuals in the exercise of their understanding, and under the influence of genuine piety,) may be so designated, the description is totally inapplicable to infants.

We may further demand, what is the *church general*, as distinct from the collective bodies of particular churches? In what conceivable sense can it be said, that a person belonging to no one of the churches that constitute the church general, nevertheless is a member of that church general? And what is the *church general*, if it be not the *family of God*? And yet, it is presumed, that an individual may be actually a member of this family, and yet not qualified to be a member of it! If any thing is here maintained, it is that a person may be a member of the family of God, and not a godly person; which is certainly not a very intelligible statement for so distinguished a divine.

Dr. Dwight, and many of our pædobaptist friends, continually *assume* that an infant is a member of the visible church, or church general: but where do they find the proof? It is assumed, as necessary to the support of pædobaptism, and of episcopalianism, of which the former is an essential pillar, and without which a national church could not easily be founded. On the other hand, we assume nothing in our argument without

positive demonstration, and demonstration which even our opponents admit to be conclusive in its nature. For instance, we assert and substantiate by an evidence which all parties acknowledge to be valid, that *adults were baptized*, and that they were baptized *upon a declaration*, or *an evidence of their faith*. The narrative of the eunuch, and the rest of the cases in the Acts, are precisely in point, and will be admitted as proofs of this statement; if our brethren proceed to aver, that infants were also baptized, of course without profession, and when incapable of it, and made members of the visible church, the *onus probandi* devolves upon them, and it is a burden which they cannot sustain. If, in the New Testament, *persons* of any class, baptized children or adults, are represented as members of the church, either general or individual, *while destitute of faith in Christ*, let the paragraph be cited; for ourselves we distinctly affirm, *it is no where to be found*; and if it be not, Dr. Dwight's whole statement is sophistical and utterly falacious!

Having thus noticed several objections without refuting them, our author proceeds to "direct arguments for infant baptism." Three are specified; of which the first relates to the Abrahamic covenant. The reasonings here are similar to those of Dr. Wardlaw and others, hereafter to be examined.

The second consideration adduced is, that "all the observations made on this subject in the New Testament accord with his view of it, and confirm the doctrine of infant baptism." What are these?

The expression of Christ, in Mark ix. 31. to "receive a child in the name of Christ," is, he affirms, "to receive him because he belongs to Christ;" which is "no other than that of receiving infants into the church." His own brethren differ from him in this interpretation; besides, the expression is not as here quoted, but "whosoever shall receive one of such children in my name;" and the *Syriac*, *Arabic*, and *Persic* versions, agree in rendering it *one like to this child*. Our Lord also refers afterwards expressly to "one of the little ones who *believe* in him." Two other passages, (Mat. ix. 13—15; and Acts ii. 38, 39.) have been often explained, and seen perfectly plain. How Christ's *blessing* them in the former case, and speaking of the *posterity* of the Jews in the latter, implies either *baptism* in the one instance, or *infants* in the other, is inconceivable! Mr. M'Lean has most forcibly argued, with regard to the former passage, that so far from countenancing infant baptism, it is a clear example to the contrary. "Here are children brought to Christ, declared of his kingdom and blessed, and thus became visible subjects; yet we read nothing of their baptism. We are sure that Christ did not baptize them, for he baptized none, (John iv. 2.) and it is certain his disciples had not baptized them formerly, else they would not have forbid their being brought to Christ; nor did our Lord command them then to baptize them, though he declares them of his kingdom, and blesses them. Hence we learn, that infants may be acknowledged to be of the kingdom of God without baptizing them." The only re-

maining example is taken from 1 Cor. vii. 14. "The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife by the husband, else were your children unclean; but now are they holy." It denotes, says our author, that the unbelieving parent is so purified, by means of his relation to the believing parent, that their mutual offspring are not unclean, but may be offered to God; or, as he before explains it, may come into his temple. The children of believing parents may therefore be offered to God in *baptism*. The Doctor has evidently here lost sight of the distinction between the legal and evangelical senses of the term holy. The unbelieving parent is *purified* by the *believing* one! Is this a doctrine to be found in Scripture? Does it accord with the universal representation throughout its hallowed pages of the *personal* nature of religion? How is an unbeliever *purified* by a believer? The apostle moreover, is not writing upon the subject of baptism, but obviating the scruples of christians about the continuance of their marriage relation with infidels. The children, he says, would not be *holy* unless the parents were so; the holiness mentioned therefore must be of the same nature in both cases, and the meaning is, the marriage continued to be lawful, and neither party should be discarded on account of the christianity of the other, because this would produce endless difficulties and litigations with regard to posterity. The argument is, "You must not put away your unbelieving wives, if they are willing to remain with you, otherwise you must also discard your children, as

the law of separation from the heathen obliged the Israelites to do with regard to the children who were conjoined with the unclean party (Deut. vii. 3. Ezra x. 3.) Under the Gospel dispensation, both the unbelieving party and the children are to be retained."

Dr. Dwight also maintains, as a third *direct* argument, that infant baptism was uniformly practised by the early christians. The *value* of this and similar assertions, will be estimated in the reply to Dr. Wardlaw. It is singular enough, that Dr. Dwight, Dr. Wardlaw, and others, who profess to trace infant baptism to *the apostles*, quote only incidental allusions from one or two writers of at least *a century or more afterwards*, and from passages of questionable authenticity and doubtful meaning!

In the last discourse upon this subject (Sermon 159) there is little to require particular animadversion; the former part of it consists, in fact, of a repetition of the sentiments already discussed; the latter part respects the *mode* of administration. The point of difference regards the assertion, that "water may be administered indifferently, either by sprinkling, affusion, or immersion." He affirms, that "*the body of learned critics and lexicographers* declare, that the *original meaning* of Βαπτίζω and Βάπτω, is to *tinge, stain, dye, or colour*, and that when *immersion* is meant, it is only a secondary and occasional sense." This is passing strange, and I confess, that the only way in which, upon the principles of christian charity, I can account for so untrue a statement is, by concluding that

Dr. Dwight *never examined them!* Let any one look at *Scapula*: the first meanings are *mergo, seu immergo*, to *dip*, to *plunge*: let him consult *Stephanus, Hederic, Suicerus, Schleusner*—all the authorities. I demand only a *simple inspection* of them, as an answer to this strange and erroneous representation.

I pass over several citations, which are refuted in the discussion of Mr. Ewing's statements, and I omit to comment on the remarks, that it is *incredible* that John should have immersed the people, and *impossible* that Peter and his companions should have done so on the day of Pentecost, as really unworthy of a serious refutation.

“Christ has *expressly* taught us,” says the Doctor, “that immersion is unessential to the administration of this ordinance.” The attempted proof of this assertion is founded on the narrative in the thirteenth chapter of John, respecting the condescension of Christ in washing the feet of Peter; particularly the words of our Lord—“He that is washed, needeth not save to wash his feet; but is clean every whit.” The argument is, that a symbolical washing, that is, sanctification, of which the act in the present instance is considered to have been the sign, is *perfect*, although applied only to the feet; as perfect as if applied to the hands and head: but the expression extends to every other symbolical washing, and therefore to baptism.

A remark or two will suffice to shew the entire fallacy of this statement.

1. Christ has not *expressly* taught us any thing,

in this passage, upon the subject of baptism, if by the word *expressly*, we are to understand “in direct terms,” which is its essential signification. If any thing is taught, it is obvious by *implication* only ; but that the implication is, that “immersion is not essential to baptism,” cannot be maintained.

2. Were it admitted, that any thing is taught by inference respecting baptism, the fair deduction would be in favour of the sentiment which Dr. Dwight opposes. There is an allusion in the narrative to washing the whole body, and to washing the feet ; but, in either case, the washing is of a kind to imply immersion. Bathing, the practice alluded to in the former case, will be allowed to have been performed by immersion : washing the feet is also an act of immersion, as commonly performed, and as specifically represented in this passage. Jesus “poured water,”—not upon the feet, but—“into a bason, and began to wash the feet of the disciples.” If this action, therefore, be considered as symbolical of baptism, so far as the mode is concerned, it would require immersion.

3. There is a lurking sophism in the use of the expression, “symbolical washing.” It may be true, that the washing represented *sanctification*, or rather sincerity of heart ; but, it is not said, to represent *baptism* ; it was not therefore baptism.

If there were any propriety in the phrase, “symbolical washing,” or any such significance in the conduct of our Lord as would sustain the pædobaptist objection, this must have been the

performance of an ordinance, not a simple expression of humility.

It was in every sense a *common washing of the feet*, and not a *symbolical rite*: intended solely to give a practical exhibition of the spirit which it became the disciples to cultivate—"If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one anothers' feet." From the cleansing nature of the water, the Saviour takes occasion to advert to the general purity of his followers, and to the lamentable exception which existed in the particular case of Judas. But are we justified in denominating this action a "symbolical washing," because our Lord availed himself of the favourable opportunity of allusively communicating some important truths? And if we were, has this any connection with the rite of baptism? The argument of Dr. Dwight would amount to this—"because Jesus washed the feet of the disciples, and because washing the feet was as good an emblem of sanctification as washing the whole body, therefore baptism may be administered by sprinkling or pouring!" Is it possible to conceive of any statement more illogical and inconclusive?

If, however, it were even conceded, that there is an allusion to baptism, it might admit of another inference which would not be at all gratifying to our opponents, but which would certainly be much more natural and obvious than that which Dr. Dwight endeavours to establish. The inference would be, not, as he says, that immersion is unessential to baptism, but that *washing the feet is*

essential. We might demand of our opponents, why they *pour*, and *sprinkle*, and do not *wash*? And why they pour or sprinkle, or simply touch with a drop of water *the face*, and not *the feet*, or *the hands*? Where is their *symbolical washing*, when they *never attempt to wash at all*?

The last citation intended to substantiate the pædobaptist doctrine of the mode of administering baptism, is from the thirty-sixth chapter of Ezekiel—"Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean; and will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes."—"It cannot be denied," says Dr. Dwight, "that this is symbolical language, in which God thought it proper to denote regeneration, by the affusion of the Spirit upon the soul." But it is obvious, that so far from representing the *affusion* of the Spirit *upon* the soul, God is declared to *put* his Spirit *within* his people. Whatever interpretation be given, it must be admitted, that *pouring upon*, or *sprinkling*, are very different acts from *putting in*, or *implanting*. Instead of this statement, being *undeniable*, one would suppose it to be *impossible not to perceive* its entire inconclusiveness and fallacy.

STRICTURES ON DR. WARDLAW'S THREE LECTURES
ON THE ABRAHAMIC COVENANT.

ALL the pædobaptist writers notice the Abrahamic covenant, and endeavour to establish the validity of their practice by inferential reasonings from that institution; but as Dr. Wardlaw treats this part of the controversy in a more elaborate manner than either Mr. Ewing or Dr. Dwight, or than most others on their side of the question, and as it is exciting an increasing degree of attention almost every day, I have thought it suitable to incorporate with my present plan, an investigation of the principal statements contained in these Lectures.

I perceive that there are two general considerations, which evidently influence all the reasonings of our pædobaptist friends, and the propriety of which they find it necessary always to presuppose. As these are often implied, and not plainly expressed, they have the effect of producing confusion, without enforcing conviction—of perplexing by their subtlety, without vanquishing by their strength; their detection, consequently, becomes of primary importance in the present discussion. The first of these relates to the *basis* of the argument from the covenant of

Abraham; the second, to the *identity* of the *other divine engagements and promises* recorded in the book of Genesis, with *that particular covenant*, the nature of which is now contested.

The general basis of the pædobaptist argument from the Abrahamic covenant is, that the ancient law of circumcision may be applied to the more recent appointment of baptism, and that to argue from the one to the other is a sound and legitimate principle of reasoning. This, however, we must deem altogether exceptionable. Each institution is of the nature of an independent law, a law of that economy under which it was appointed. Circumcision was a law or institute of the Mosaic economy, enacted for particular purposes explicitly stated at the time by the Divine Legislator; baptism is a law or institute of the christian dispensation, enjoined in a similar manner, and by the same indisputable authority. But neither the one nor the other originated in the fitness of things, or in any consideration of a moral nature; the propriety of each is traceable solely to the will of the institutor, and the obligation to practise either rite arises out of the revelation of that will. This is no new principle, but one universally admitted and constantly applied to all the institutions of worship. Hence the necessity of circumcision, or the necessity of baptism, is to be ascertained by the declared law of the case—by the terms in which either is promulgated, and the sanction which gives them validity. Here are two divine institutions, appointed at the distance of many centuries, and under two distinct economies of Providence. To

know what circumcision was, and by whom to be observed, we must repair to the recorded enactments; to know what baptism is, it was requisite to make a similar appeal. Having proceeded thus far, and having found that the command for the observance of the one contains no allusion to the other—that there is in the appointment of circumcision, no anticipating reference to baptism, and in the institution of baptism, no retrospective glance at circumcision—we arrive at the discovery of another fact, namely, that the one has *ceased*—that it ceased with the economy to which it was primarily attached—and that in the newly instituted rite there is no mention of the former, no reference to its existence, or to its termination; no one term, either direct or allusive, calculated to excite the idea, that any connection subsisted between them. If the whole, or any part of the previous institution, were intended to furnish a ground for the observance of the subsequently established rite, if there were any such intended analogy or relation between the two, as to constitute the *ground* or *reason* of the enactment in either case, or any such analogy as was meant to afford an example for the due observance of either, it must have been stated: whereas both the one and the other rest on the simple statutory principle of the *command*. Circumcision then, being a positive institution, cannot furnish a rule for another positive institution, since each stands upon its own independent basis, is never recognized as in any way connected with the other, and is perfectly different in the mode and reasons of its observance;

much less can circumcision furnish any sanction to the practice of *infant* baptism, since that is never once mentioned either in the Old Testament or the New.

The second source of perplexity in this part of the controversy, arises from the pædobaptist attempt to identify all the ancient promises and covenants with the law of circumcision. It is, we admit, essential to give even plausibility to their argument, to view them as one; but truth requires them to be considered as altogether distinct. To judge the more accurately upon this subject, and to come to the very point of disagreement between the two classes of disputants, and thus to be enabled to dispose of Dr. Wardlaw's reasonings, it will now be necessary to advert to the covenant in question, called *the Covenant of Circumcision*; and the better to comprehend its purport, and to prove its peculiarity, it shall be cited at length from the sacred record. “ *I will make my covenant between me and thee, and will multiply thee exceedingly. Behold, my covenant is with thee, and thou shalt be a father of many nations—a father of many nations have I made thee—I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant; to be a God unto thee, and thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God. This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and you, and thy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised. And ye*

shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a token of the covenant between me and you. And he that is eight days old, shall be circumcised among you, every man-child in your generations; he that is born in the house, or bought with money of any stranger, which is not of thy seed. He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised: and my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant. And the uncircumcised man-child, whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he hath broken my covenant." Gen. xvii. 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10—14. In Romans iv. 11. the Apostle speaks of Abraham having received *the sign of circumcision*. Let a person, unbiassed by any previous system, put into ordinary language the covenanted blessings in the above recited paragraph; let him impartially state its entire import. Would he not inevitably give the following interpretation? Circumcision was a sign of the establishment of a covenant with Abraham and his posterity, denoting that it was the divine purpose to increase his family to a remarkable degree, so that they should become a great nation, and even be diffused afar over the surface of the earth—to manifest a peculiar and unalterable regard to his family as their God, by the ample fulfilment of the agreement which he now condescended to form with their illustrious ancestor, and which stipulated their extraordinary multiplication—and to give them Canaan for an inheritance. All persons, however attached to the family, whether as children or servants, were to undergo the pre-

scribed rite, in order to distinguish them from the surrounding nations, and to evince that they belonged to the people whom God had especially chosen. This token of association with Abraham, and participation of his privileges, was, it appears, bestowed irrespectively of personal character, conduct, or faith; for the purchased slave received it as well as the home-born child, whether a believer in the God of Abraham or not, and simply as a part of his domestic establishment. But though they were to undergo the painful rite, the promise of inheritance was restricted to the posterity of the individual who stood as their federal representative, and who, by this ordinance, were separated and distinguished from all the Gentile nations.

Dr. W. commences the argument of his discourses by affirming that circumcision "was a *sign* of the blessings bestowed in justification. It represented the taking away of sin; both in its *guilt* and its *pollution*, that is, it represented the two great blessings of justification and sanctification." It was also, he adds, "a sign that the seed, in whom all nations were to be blessed, should come from the loins of Abraham."

Will Dr. W. or any of his brethren, have the goodness to point out the phrases which represent the *two great blessings of justification and sanctification*? Here is not only a general statement of the existence of a covenant between God and Abraham, but a specification of the design of that covenant, and the blessings of which it gave assurance to that eminent servant of God. Is *justifi-*

cation mentioned? Is *sanctification* intimated? Is the removal of *sin* promised? Were the infants of eight days old, were the born servants, or the purchased slaves, spiritually renewed by being externally circumcised, or was the token of their belonging to *Abraham's family*, a proof of their actually possessing, or being the predestined partakers of *Abraham's faith*?

“ But it is urged,” says Mr. Kinghorn,* “ the Lord declared to Abraham, ‘ I will establish my covenant to be a God to thee, and thy seed after thee.’ Gen. xvii. 7. True; but in what sense? Surely none will maintain, that God engaged to bestow special spiritual blessings on all the natural seed of Abraham; for this was not the fact in any age; and we cannot imagine the covenant intended to point out what was not fulfilled. In a great variety or respects God *was* the God of Abraham’s posterity, and still *is* their God: when they obeyed him, he blessed them; when they rebelled, he punished them in an awful and marked manner. But, in neither case, do we see any evidence that spiritual grace was bestowed through the means of circumcision; and unless this could be established, the end for which the present argument is urged is not obtained; for every thing else extends no farther than to national blessings, and the enjoyment of external means of improvement.”

That Dr. Wardlaw errs at the very commence-

*The Argument, in support of Infant Baptism, from the Covenant of Circumcision, examined, and shewn to be invalid. p. 10.

ment, in common with his brethren, is further obvious from the considerations, that neither he nor they can ever find the passage in which the covenant of circumcision is called the covenant of grace—nor can they point out the text wherein the temporal blessings given to Abraham are mentioned in the covenant of grace—nor can they shew, if the term were identical, how Melchizedek, Lot, and others, should be included in the covenant of grace, which none will deny, yet were not in the covenant of circumcision; or how Ishmael and Esau should be in the covenant of circumcision, yet had no portion of the covenant of grace—nor is it possible for them to obviate the difficulty, that if Abraham were the federal head of his natural and spiritual seed, or of the covenant of grace, and Christ is confessedly the head of the same covenant, there must be two heads of that covenant, having, in fact, as such, a conflicting title of superiority. It is the first and great mistake respecting the covenant itself, that perplexes the whole subject, pollutes all the subsequent reasonings, and confounds together things which essentially differ.

Circumcision is also denominated “a seal of the righteousness of the faith, which he (Abraham) had, yet being uncircumcised.” Our author considers the meaning to be, that it was a seal or pledge of righteousness or justification, being by the faith which he had in uncircumcision. It was not, he thinks, a seal of his personal faith or acceptance, but of justification, being by “the faith of Abraham.” It is declared, however, with re-

ference to a period long previous to his circumcision, that “ he believed in the Lord, and he accounted it to him for righteousness,” and the Apostle pleads for justification by faith, from the fact of Abraham’s being so justified before the covenant of circumcision was promulgated. It is termed “ a seal of the righteousness of the faith which *he had*, yet being uncircumcised.” This language surely represents it as a token of his acceptance as a believer—a seal of *his* justification *before* he was circumcised—a public pledge that his faith was imputed to him for righteousness, or that God accepted his faith, and an exhibition of the doctrine, that their faith should be imputed in a similar manner to all subsequent believers. Thus it involved essentially a personal reference, while it represented a general truth. It could in no other sense be a *seal* or *pledge*—neither the infant children of Abraham, nor the *strangers* in his family, could receive or comprehend the significance of any such attestation. Besides, no language can be more express: “ If *Abraham* were justified by works, *he* hath whereof to glory, but not before God. For what saith the Scripture? *Abraham* believed God, and it was counted unto *him* for righteousness.” Dr. Wardlaw’s objection, that a direct and positive assurance of his being a believer, seems quite incompatible with the idea of the propriety of further *trials* of his faith, can have no force in its application to our sentiment; because it would, if it possessed any weight, equally invalidate his own statement, inasmuch as the reason why his faith should be *tried* would be

equally available whether he were assured of acceptance on the ground of his personal faith, or of its identity, in point of character, with the faith of all other genuine believers.

This representation is, however, altogether unfounded; because the very persons who are described in the apostolical epistles as being sealed by the Spirit to the day of redemption, and rejoicing with unspeakable joy in Christ, were, nevertheless, severely exercised with manifold tribulations.

It is further argued,—“The promises made to Abraham were expressly repeated by God to Isaac and Jacob: to the former, Gen. xxvi. 1—5. and to the latter, Gen. xxviii. 10—15. Now I hardly think any one will say, that while circumcision was to Abraham a seal of the righteousness of faith, it was to Isaac and Jacob, these heirs with him of the same promise, a mere mark of their carnal descent from Abraham, and of their heirship of temporal blessings. Was it not to them a seal or pledge of the faithfulness of God to that promise of which they were fellow-heirs with their father? that is, a seal of *spiritual* blessings, which is the same thing, in effect, as a seal of the righteousness of faith. I cannot think it was less. Yet if it was so, we have here a seal of spiritual blessings administered, by divine command, to infants of eight days old. And this shews there is no absurdity in the thing itself, and no absurdity in the idea of circumcision being a seal, to *all* who should afterwards believe, of the righteousness of faith, or of the same

blessings which it sealed originally; for what may be in one case may be in ten thousand." p. 14.

The promises made to Abraham, and renewed to Isaac and Jacob, were partly temporal, and partly spiritual: this will be at once obvious by simply perusing the above-mentioned passages in Genesis. These passages do not recite the covenant of circumcision only, but in a brief form that and the preceding engagements with Abraham, comprehensive of spiritual blessings. I have already shewn that the covenant of circumcision included solely temporal blessings; and that the rite was instituted to distinguish the Jews from other nations, and to shew their title to the land of Canaan. The single promise of another kind here quoted,—“In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed,”—refers to *another* covenant, *previously* made, and not *peculiar* to Abraham, but a renewal and ratification of the promise to our first parents. Abraham, therefore, sustained the twofold relation of the representative of those who should believe the original promise, and were therefore his spiritual descendants, and the political head of the Jewish nation, and trustee, if I may so express it, of their temporal possessions, the assurance of which was connected with the rite of circumcision.

Circumcision was, I allow, “a seal to Abraham of the righteousness of faith.” Dr. Wardlaw says he can “hardly think any one will say, that while this was the case with him, it was to Isaac and Jacob, heirs of the same promise, a mere mark of

earnal descent, and of heirship to temporal blessings." Undoubtedly Isaac and Jacob were co-heirs with Abraham, and circumcision indicated to them what it did to *all* his posterity; for in fact there is no reason for this discrimination in favour of those eminent patriarchs; that is, it indicated to them their heirship by birth of the temporal promises, and their equal participation by faith of the spiritual blessings. The indiscriminate administration of circumcision to all the seed of Abraham was the mark of their separation from other nations, and possession of certain temporal blessings peculiarly appropriated to them; their enjoyment of the spiritual mercies of the covenant was expressly suspended upon their *faith*; for in all the apostolic reasonings upon the subject, the distinction is constantly, and with the utmost care preserved;—"They which are of *faith*, the same are the children of Abraham."

It is not only obvious that our author is wrong in stating that we have here "a seal of spiritual blessings administered to infants of eight days old," but the idea is manifestly inadmissible. A seal, our opponents argue, is a pledge. It was a pledge to Abraham—of what? of the righteousness of faith, or of his justification through faith? Dr. W. before states it represented the two great blessings of justification and sanctification. Was it then a pledge of justification to infants of eight days old? This *must* be conceded upon the principles of our author and his friends. But here there is only one alternative; either they were justified and sanctified at the time, or they were

to be in future. It will not be affirmed they were so *at the time*; though even this ought in all consistency to be maintained, as this was the essential purport of the seal to Abraham. Were they then afterwards partakers of these spiritual blessings? Were the descendants of Abraham universally believers? Did all the infant offspring of the Jews partake of redemption? Were they indeed chosen to eternal life because they were circumcised? Will any one affirm this? or aim to vindicate for one moment such an opinion, in defiance of fact, and of apostolic authority,—“Neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but *faith*, which worketh by love?” Gal. v. 6. To say it was a seal of righteousness to those who should afterwards believe, is to affirm that it had two different meanings in its administration to the different classes of infants, which it required an omniscient wisdom to discriminate. Unless the believing children were pointed out, it could be no seal of righteousness when administered to them; for how could it seal that which they might never possess? And in what passage is circumcision restricted to the *believing* infant posterity of Abraham?

Abraham is described, (Rom. iv. 12,) “The father of circumcision, to them who are not of the circumcision only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith of our father Abraham, which he had, being yet uncircumcised.” It is previously stated that he received this sign and seal—“that he might be the father of all them that believe.” Dr. W. argues, that if circumcision was only a mark of

carnal descent, and a title to temporal blessings, Abraham was the father of circumcision, in the only true and proper sense of the appellation, to all his fleshly seed ; yet he is here declared to have been the father of circumcision, not to those only who were circumcised in the flesh, but to those also who walked in the steps of his faith. Circumcision was therefore a seal of spiritual blessings.

But what is the apostle's representation ? Is it not that by *faith* both Jews and Gentiles are interested in the blessings of salvation ? Abraham was not *constituted* a believer by circumcision ; it was a token only of the *acceptance* of his faith which *previously existed*. As circumcision, then, had a twofold aspect ; the one relating to the temporal blessings promised to his posterity, the other to his faith, a faith essentially the same with the faith of all believers to the end of time ; so he was the father of a numerous posterity, who should inherit temporal blessings, as their head and representative ; and the father of a spiritual race, as having a faith the acceptance of which was sealed to him in circumcision ; by which, in a spiritual sense, he became the father, or head and representative of all believers in future times. Hence he is termed, not only “ the father of them that believe,” but the father also of *circumcision* to them that believe ; that is, the father of circumcision to them of his natural seed, not only who are circumcised, but who walk in the steps of his faith. It was in the act of circumcision, or by the performance of this rite, that he received the divine

and public recognition of his faith. His faith, attested by circumcision, rendered him a fit *representative* of future believers, whether Jews or Gentiles; but this, surely, is no kind of evidence that *circumcision* sealed spiritual blessings. "If Abraham," as Mr. M'Lean judiciously remarks, in his Letters to Mr. Glas, "was not a father to his natural seed, *as such*, in that respect wherein circumcision sealed or confirmed to him the righteousness of his faith, then circumcision was not such a seal to his natural seed; nor could it be such a seal to infants at eight days old, who had not that faith before circumcision; but respected only the temporal promise and relation, which promise and relation had a typical reference to the eternal promise, and the spiritual relation arising from it."

Dr. Wardlaw interprets Rom. iv. 13. thus;—The promise that Abraham should be "heir of the world" must be understood to refer also to his seed, and to include the possession of Canaan—the possession of the whole earth—and the final possession of the heavenly country itself. Hence, he maintains, that "the promises contained in the Abrahamic covenant, both the *temporal* promise and the *spiritual*, were made to the *same seed*, on the *same footing*." He affirms, there is no hint that the temporal promise was made to the fleshly seed as such, and the spiritual promise to the spiritual seed as such; and that the covenant with Abraham does not contain two distinct covenants, the one temporal, and the other spiritual,

but is *one* covenant, though it includes different promises to the *whole seed*.

This really appears a most perplexed, inconclusive, and unscriptural statement. I demand of Dr. Wardlaw, whether the covenant made with Abraham many years *before* the covenant of circumcision, namely, that of which the apostle speaks as “confirmed of God in Christ” four hundred and thirty years before the law, (Gal. iii. 17.) and which expressly secured *spiritual blessings*, was the same with the covenant of circumcision, which expressly limited its stipulations to *temporal blessings*? It would be a most extraordinary—a most unparalleled circumstance, if one covenant should be deemed identical with another, which omits the most desirable and important of all its promises! The constant insinuation, and indeed direct averment of our brethren, that the communications to Abraham were substantially identical, is contradictory to Scripture; for the apostle does not speak of them as *the covenant*, but, using the plural number, as the COVENANTS, and the COVENANTS *of promise*. Rom. ix. 4. Eph. ii. 12. Let the reader re-peruse the covenant of circumcision, which has been already quoted at length, and let him discover, if he can, the clause, “In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed.” This was included only in the first promise to Abraham, which was a republication of the prediction given to Adam, and of the covenant with Noah, whose names were henceforth merged in that of Abraham as the spiritual repre-

sentative of future believers, through his “believing God, and it was counted to him for righteousness,”—a description applied to him with reference to a period *long prior* to the command respecting circumcision. To employ the phrase, *Abrahamic covenant*, then, as expressive of *two distinct covenants*, given at two different and distant periods, and for different purposes, is a manifest confusion of language, and misinterpretation of Scripture; and to affirm that the covenant of circumcision includes both the *temporal* and *spiritual promises*, when the spiritual promise is *entirely omitted* in its stipulations, is a direct contradiction of the inspired record. Our opponents might be asked, by what covenant are believers justified? Is it not by the covenant of grace, through the blood of Christ, by which it was ratified? And by what covenant was Abraham justified? Was it not by faith in the same covenant; the Gospel being, as the apostle represents, preached to him, so that he “saw the day of Christ,” through the glorious prediction that “all nations should be blessed in him,” and “was glad?” If so, then the covenant of grace, and the covenant of circumcision were not the same; for none will presume to say that he was justified by circumcision.

The statement that both promises are bestowed on the same seed, and on the same footing, is equally erroneous. Dr. Wardlaw will never, surely, attempt to prove that all the seed of Abraham according to the flesh were partakers of salvation—that they were all justified and sanctified! If the promises of circumcision were tem-

poral, they were fulfilled; if they are supposed to have been spiritual, they were not accomplished. His seed possessed Canaan; but this seed, collectively considered, do *not* possess the heavenly blessedness. And what will Dr. Wardlaw's affirmation, that no hint of this kind is given, avail against the perspicuous and pointed language of the epistle to the Galatians?—"Know ye, therefore, that they which are of *faith*, the same are the children of Abraham. And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify *the heathen through faith*, preached before the Gospel unto Abraham, (saying,) In thee shall all nations be blessed. So then they which be of *faith* are blessed with faithful Abraham." Were they who are described of *faith* the natural descendants of Abraham? Are the *heathen*, the *Gentiles* who are justified through faith, the posterity of Abraham according to the flesh? Are the circumcised children of eight days old, and the spiritual children by faith the *same seed*? Are the children of eight days old promised *heaven*? Are the generations of *believers* promised the earthly *land of Canaan*? If not, what becomes of the assertion, the attempt to prove which is so elaborated;—"The promises contained in the Abrahamic covenant, both the *temporal* promise, and the *spiritual*, were made to the *same seed*, on the *same footing*?"

The language of VENEMA, (Select Works, Let. I.) a celebrated *pædobaptist* commentator, is very important and express on this subject. "Celestial prerogatives cannot be transmitted from parents to children; nor can that idea be

rendered consistent, either with the economy of grace, or the justice of God. No one is sanctified to the Lord for the sake of another man: not infants in virtue of their descent from believers; for this the Scripture nowhere affirms, nor is it consistent with reason." Dr. OWEN, also, (on Epist. to Hebrews,) is very explicit.—“Two privileges did God grant unto Abraham, upon his separation to a special interest in the old promise and covenant. First, That according to the flesh he should be the father of the Messiah, the promised seed, who was the very life of the covenant, the fountain and cause of all the blessings contained in it. That this privilege was temporary the thing itself doth demonstrate. Secondly; Together with this he had also another privilege granted unto him: namely, that his faith, whereby he was personally interested in the covenant, should be the pattern of the faith of the church in all generations; and that none should ever come to be a member of it, or a sharer in its blessings, but by the same faith that he had fixed on the seed that was in the promise, to be brought forth from him in the world. On the account of this privilege he became the father of all them that do believe. For they that are of the faith, the same are the children of Abraham, Gal iii. 17. Rom. iv. 11; as also heirs of the world, Rom. iv. 13; in that all that should believe throughout the world, being thereby implanted into the covenant made with him, should become his spiritual children. Answerable unto this twofold end of the separation of Abraham, there was a *double seed* allotted unto him. A seed

according to the *flesh*, separated to the bringing forth of the Messiah according to the flesh; and a seed according to the *promise*, that is, such as by faith should have an interest in the promise, or all the elect of God." Dr. Wardlaw, however, it appears, in common with his brethren, can see in the fleshly seed of Abraham, and in his spiritual seed—in those who were circumcised as his natural descendants, and those who, being believers, are spiritual children—but *one seed*; and they cannot see it, though the apostle declares it repeatedly; though *the children of the flesh*, and *the children of God*, or *the children of the promise* are, in Rom. ix. 8. plainly, and in so many words distinguished!!

The deductions of Dr. Wardlaw's third Lecture being founded entirely upon his preceding statements, their validity must necessarily depend upon those statements; but as we have shewn these premises to be erroneous, it follows, of course, that the inferences attempted to be established must be inconclusive. If the argument in support of infant baptism be taken from a particular interpretation of the doctrine of the Abrahamic covenant, and if it have been shewn, (as we believe it has successfully,) that the interpretation in question is incorrect, this alleged proof, by inference, entirely fails. Here, without further trouble, we might take our stand, and close the inquiry; but the nature of the subject, and the respectability of the reasoner require a few additional remarks. "On the supposition," says Dr. W. "that the truth of any doctrine, or the pro-

priety of any practice should be established from the book of Genesis, it would be as firmly established as if the proof had been taken from the epistle to the Romans; inasmuch as the book of Genesis is *the word of God* as well as the epistle to the Romans." This is a very favourite maxim with our brethren, and strongly insisted upon, for this obvious reason,—it is necessary to their system: it contains, however, a sophism, and cannot be substantiated. The *truth of a doctrine*, and the *propriety of a practice* are two different considerations. Truth must be truth, under every dispensation, and in every period of the world. The truth that God created the world, or that "all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God," can never be invalidated by any vicissitude of circumstance, or lapse of time; but a precept enjoining a particular practice, may continue in force or not, according to the nature and design of that precept. If the practice enjoined were obligatory, by the very terms of it, or by the circumstances of time and place, only on an individual, or a family, or one nation, or one nation at a particular period of their history; if it were positive and not moral; if it constituted the nature of a *sign*, intended to cease when the significant purpose was answered,—in either of these cases, and in many other supposable instances, the truth of a doctrine might be incontestible, while the propriety of a practice might be negatived; and while it was established in Genesis, it might be far from being as firmly established in the epistle to the Romans. In the present instance, how-

ever, the propriety of the *practice of circumcision*, which is *established* in Genesis, is not only not re-established, but absolutely *abolished* (our opponents themselves being judges,) in every part of the New Testament.

The only plea left is, that *baptism comes in the place of circumcision*: and this is affirmed by all pædobaptist writers, and by our author in the following manner: "Circumcision and baptism signify or represent the same things, with this difference, that the former seems to have contained in its import, a notification of Messiah, *as to come*, which of course, at his coming, ceased to be necessary. And this, as I formerly observed, furnishes a good reason for the substitution of another rite in its place. What circumcision denoted by the cutting off of the flesh, baptism represents by the cleansing virtue of water—the taking away of sin, in its guilt and in its pollution, by the blood and spirit of Christ." p. 73.

Do baptism and circumcision signify the same things? Let us inquire. Dr. W. states, as we have seen, that circumcision was a sign of the blessings bestowed in justification. It was intended *also*, he says, as a sign, that the seed in whom all nations were to be blessed, should come from the loins of Abraham. In the very passage, however, now under consideration, he concedes, that in this latter respect they did *not* signify *the same thing*, for the coming of Christ abolished the *sign*, as a notification of his approach. We have shewn too, that circumcision signified certain temporal blessings, which were thus, as by promise,

ensured to the Jews: whether our brethren admit these to be *exclusively* signified or not, they do not pretend to deny, that they *are* represented. But does *baptism* signify *the same thing*? Certainly not. Mr. Ewing is very strenuous in maintaining that baptism was significant of the pouring down of the Holy Spirit. In conformity with the same idea Dr. Williams had long since stated, that “in baptism is *eminently* exhibited the down-pouring of the Holy Spirit,” and that “there is no object whatever in all the New Testament, so *frequently* and so *explicitly* signified by baptism, as *these divine influences*.” Did *circumcision* signify *the same thing*? Our brethren will admit, because they frequently assert, that by baptism we have communion with Christ in his death; we enjoy a participation of the benefits which result from his death and resurrection, and are made conformable to the design of his death and resurrection. Has *circumcision* a similar significance? Does it represent *the same things*? The analogy, in whatever manner explained, is of the same slender description; and, in fact, the two institutions, though applied in one or two instances metaphorically and allusively to similar considerations of a spiritual nature, really on the whole, were very different in their significations.

If, in one word, Dr. Wardlaw will point out any individual passage in the Scriptures, in *Genesis*, or in *Romans*—in *Moses*, or in *Paul*—wherein baptism is represented as substituted for *circumcision*, *we will believe it!*

It is somewhat triumphantly asked, “if the Abra-

hamic covenant is the everlasting covenant under which we at present are—if circumcision was administered to the children of those who professed the faith of this covenant—where is any change in its constitution, in this respect, pointed out?

When were children excluded, and by what law?"

I answer, it has been *demonstrated* (and must ever be considered so in all reason, till the preceding arguments are refuted,) that the Abrahamic covenant was *not* the everlasting covenant under which we live—that even circumcision, which was *not* a sign of Abraham being the federal head of the dispensation of grace, was *not* administered to the children of those only who professed his faith, for it was administered to servants and slaves, and captives, nor was it administered to all believers, but to Abraham, his family, and descendants only—and consequently, though it be true, that children were never *excluded* from the covenant of grace, the reason is, they were never, as children, *included*!

The covenants made with Abraham, so far as they were analogous in any of their stipulations with the covenant of grace, could not be made with his natural seed; for the mocking Ishmael, and the profane Esau, were excluded; and none will pretend that the covenant of grace embraced, which upon this hypothesis it must have done, the unbelievers who fell in the wilderness, the ten tribes who revolted from the God of Israel, and worshipped calves at Dan and Bethel; and the Scribes, Pharisees, and enemies of Christ, in the days of his humanity.

Besides, if baptism assumes the place of circum-

cision, it is requisite, not only that they should have the same general signification, but that the former should be practised on the same persons, or that a sufficient reason for any difference should be produced. If Abraham, his male children and servants, as well as those of every Jew and proselyte, were to be circumcised, a believer under the christian dispensation, should not only himself be baptized, but enforce the observance of the same rite upon all his domestics; if not, upon what principle is the distinction to be observed? There is, in fact, a curious discrepancy in the analogical argument; for while, on the one hand, baptism, according to our opponents, is to be administered *exclusively* to the *children of believers*, but *indiscriminately* as to *sex*; on the other, circumcision, they admit, was practised *indiscriminately* with regard to the Jew and the proselyte, and their whole domestic establishment irrespectively of *faith*, and *exclusively* on the *male* descendants: so that, instead of the analogy, which should render the one a proper substitute for the other, it is traceable in *neither point* of requisite similarity. Instead of *agreeing*, they *differ* in *both* respects! We should be glad to know, in what manner our pædobaptist friends can possibly obviate this difficulty.

The argument from the baptism of households, and other considerations, has been already disposed of in the former part of this volume; I have only now to advert to the complete failure of the doctrine of analogy, upon which our brethren place their great dependence. Dr. W. has occu-

pied many pages in his second lecture, in shewing that the nation of Israel was the church of God—the visible church—and that, though very much corrupted, during many ages, it was, nevertheless, the church, and resembled the condition of the church of Christ, in many periods after his coming. He appeals to the language of the prophecies, in which he says, *Zion*, or *the church*, is represented as mourning for her *children*, or the expulsion of a multitude of the ancient people of God, and in which the Gentiles are described as being brought into the church of God. This is designed as explanatory of the expression, “I will be their God.” The people of Israel then constituted the church—the families of Israel constituted the people—men, women, and children, constituted the families; therefore, men, women, and children—infants without understanding, and adults without piety, constituted the church of God. *Children* especially, it is to be noticed (and Dr. W. has repeatedly marked the term in italics) were members of the visible church—and they became so by circumcision, as a part of the family of the great patriarch, the nation of Israel, and participators of the Abrahamic covenant.

Were this analogy admitted, it would follow that the children of Christian parents are by baptism members of the visible church of Christ, and consequently may and must be allowed to partake of its privileges. Neither repentance nor faith can be requisite; because neither the one nor the other was necessary to constitute Israelites members of the visible church, of the nation. They

belonged to it by virtue of their circumcision, and as they grew up, partook of the passover, and other religious enjoyments, as the children of the circumcision; consequently, the baptized children of christian parents, being members of the visible church by baptism, have a right to the christian passover, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and to all the privileges of the church. Nor is this all; a Jew, whether pious or immoral, could demand circumcision for his male offspring, as a sign of the covenant; therefore, whoever believes in christianity, may demand baptism for his children. This, indeed, would be a corrupt church; but, according to Dr. W.'s reasoning, it would be the church of Christ, and its imperfection would not militate against the fact of its existence. If the analogy does not prove this, it proves nothing; and there is, in fact, no analogy. If the premises were good, the conclusion would not be deducible, and Dr. W. would be sorry that it should; but the premises are wholly untenable; and Dr. W. has not adduced a single passage in all his citations, and *never can produce one*, in which his sense of the term *church*, as a protestant dissenter, is applied to the nation of Israel. If then the ancient church were national, and the christian church is congregational, and "an assembly of faithful men," the whole of his statement is fallacious.

In addition to these considerations, the doctrine of analogy on this point fails in every way. Infants under the law were *expressly commanded* to be circumcised; infants under the Gospel are *not expressly commanded* to be baptized—it is only that

the continuance of the same state of things is to be *inferred from the general strain of expression* occasionally employed, (Lect. iii. p. 84. n.) Infants under the law were members of the Jewish visible church, infants under the Gospel are not (by the admission of our brethren,) members of the visible church of Christ. Circumcision was practised on Jews only; baptism is dispensed to both Jews and Gentiles. Circumcision was administered only on the eighth day, even in the case of extreme danger; baptism may be administered at any period. Circumcision was performed only on males; baptism is applied to male and female. Circumcision was administered to infants as the descendants of Abraham, the head of the Jewish nation; baptism is not administered to descendants of Christ as the head of the christian church—not to them as *natural descendants*—not to them as *spiritual descendants*, for confessedly, their even being children of pious parents, does not constitute them *believers*, on which account only they could be called the spiritual seed either of Abraham or of Christ. It is surely a very impressive consideration, that while the whole argument of our pædobaptist brethren from the Abrahamic covenant is founded upon analogy, *in every important respect the analogy fails!*

Were this method of inferential reasoning from the ancient institutions to the christian economy admissible, it would go far beyond what our brethren could desire, and fully justify the representations of the papists. They plead for the *worship of relics*, from the care of Moses for the bones of

Joseph (Exod. xiii. 19;) for the use of *the sign of the cross*, from the striking and sprinkling of the lintel and two side-posts of the door with blood (Exod. xii. 22, 23,) though episcopalians prefer the fact of Jacob's crossing his hands to bless Ephraim and Manasseh, (Gen. lxxviii. 14;) for the *Pope's infallibility* from the malediction pronounced against the man that will not hearken unto the priest (Deut. xvii. 12;) and for many other absurdities, from equally available premises!

It is really surprising, that towards the close of his lectures, Dr. W. should reiterate the often-repeated and often-answered statement, that baptism was from *the earliest times* of the christian æra; administered to infants. "It is," he adds, "alluded to, and directly spoken of, by the *earliest writers*, never as a thing that was, or had been questioned; but uniformly as a matter, the existence of which from the beginning was undisputed." p. 91. To give the direct negative to this assertion, and in the plainest language, might seem uncourteous; and yet what ought to be done, when aware and able to prove, that the contrary is the undoubted fact? The writers of the first century, who will be allowed to have been the *earliest* next the Apostles, are Barnabas, Hermas, Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, and Polycarp; and *not one of these* speaks of baptism being administered to infants. Barnabas mentions the persons baptized as "*putting their trust in the cross*;" and as "*going down into the water full of sins and pollutions, but coming up again bringing forth fruit, having in their hearts the fear and hope which is in Jesus by the Spirit.*" (Epist. ix.)

Hermas represents them as “having *heard the word*, and being *willing* to be baptized in the name of the Lord (Past. lib. i. v. 3;) Clemens and Polycarp make *no allusion* to infant baptism; the same may be said of Ignatius—he only mentions baptism in connection with faith, love, and patience. Will any pædobaptist writer after this venture to reassert that infant baptism is spoken of by the *earliest writers* in *direct terms*, and as a thing *not questioned*? If any one does, he will surely merit a stronger epithet than *ignorant*, or *rash*, or *prejudiced*; the assertion must be made in defiance of *ascertained fact*!

The representation of Dr. Wardlaw cannot be substantiated by any reference even to writers of the next age, and of less remote antiquity. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Tatian, Minutius Felix, Irenæus and Clemens of Alexandria, constitute the christian writers of the *second century*; who, so far from *directly* speaking of infant baptism as an *unquestioned practice*, never once utter a syllable upon the subject. Not one of them names infant baptism; and whenever baptism is mentioned it is wholly in our favour. The *only* passage which is referred to out of them all, is a sentence in Irenæus, the whole evidence of which depends upon the translation of a *single word*, (*renascuntur*;) the most literal sense of which is, *born again*, but which some would render *baptized*. But, as Dr. Gale proves, the chapter whence it is taken is spurious, since it contains a statement contrary to the Scripture,

and the known sentiment of the writer himself; namely, that Christ lived to more than fifty years of age.

CURCELLÆUS remarks, "The baptism of infants in the first two centuries after Christ was altogether unknown:" and SUICERUS, with equal truth and candour, states that "no one received baptism during the first two centuries, except he who was instructed in the faith, initiated into the doctrines of Christ, and able to testify that he believed; because it is written, 'he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved;' therefore it was necessary in the first place to *believe*: hence arose the order of catechumens in the church. At that time, also, the custom was universally and constantly observed, to give the eucharist to catechumens immediately after their baptism."

To all these facts with regard to the two *earliest* centuries, let it be added, that the very first writer who speaks of infant baptism in the third century, Tertullian, in fact CONDEMNNS it!

FINIS.













